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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic (FRP) has increased recently in marine structures 
with a minimum of engineering analysis and design evolution. Although fiberglass has been used 
for many years in small recreational and high-performance boats, a range of new composite 
materials are now being utilized for various applications. The objective of this document is to 
examine the use of FRP materials in marine construction, determine important considerations in 
fire safety, as prescribed in SOLAS rules and evaluate the application of Regulation 17. 
Over 30 years of FRP boat building experience stands behind today's pleasure boats. Complex 
configurations and the advantages of seamless hulls were the driving factors in the development 
of FRP boats. FRP materials have gained unilateral acceptance in pleasure craft because of light 
weight, vibration damping, corrosion resistance, impact resistance, low construction costs and 
ease of fabrication, maintenance and repair. 
Fibre reinforced polymer (FRP) construction has been the mainstay of the recreational 
boating. Much of the early FRP structural design work relied on trial and error, which may have 
also led to the high attrition rate of start-up builders. Current leading edge manufacturing 
technologies are driven by racing vessels, both power and sail. 
Fibre reinforced polymer (FRP) composites have been widely used in naval ships since the 
1960s. An important reason for using FRP materials in naval vessels has been their non-magnetic 
properties, making them suitable for mine countermeasure vessels. Low weight has also been an 
important factor in their introduction into high-speed craft, especially patrol vessels and more 
recently the Swedish corvette Visby.  
In recent years an increasing motivation for using FRP materials has been the possibility to 
build in not only tailor-made mechanical properties but also other features related to signatures 
and sensors. This has led to extensive use of such materials in masts and radomes as well as 
numerous other secondary structures and components on otherwise steel vessels.  
In spite of these advantages, adoption of fibre composites in vessels has not always been a 
straight forward matter. A major obstacle has been the combustibility of named materials. At the 
beginning of the 1990s it became clear that some of the obstacles had to be removed if 
composites were to achieve more widespread use in vessels.  
 
1.1. Scope of Thesis 
 
The importance and the potential innovation that composite materials represent in nautical, 
naval and military construction in Europe and in most of the countries of the world involved in 
these kinds of construction have inspired the author of this thesis. The construction of large 
vessels from composite materials represents a challenging task. There has been an increase in the 
activity of the nautical construction industry, innovation and creativity can lead to the 
development of new markets. The use of composite materials can contribute to this. 
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The need for both cost reduction and lighter vessels led to the try for even greater use of 
composite materials. Of course, current regulatory framework has to be amended so the safe 
navigation to be ensured. This aspect is shown to be investigated under the SOLAS rules and 
more specific the Regulation 17, which shall approve or not, alternative methodology for the 
engineering analysis, required by SOLAS regulation II-2/17 on Alternative design and 
arrangements, applying to a specific fire safety system, design or arrangements for which the 
approval of an alternative design deviating from the prescriptive requirements of SOLAS chapter 
II-2 is sought.  
The aim of this thesis is to perform a comprehensive description of the regulations needed to 
be followed while using FRP materials on vessels. The design and fabrication of a large vessel 
from composite materials is shown to be totally within the present state-of-the-art, but a number 
of major technical aspects are questionable. Also, reduction of the perceived risk of fire, in using 
current technologies in large-scale ship fabrication, had to be included. 
 
1.2. Overview of Thesis 
 
The operational requirements of the maritime agencies and organizations require high 
performance marine vessels, which demand increased structural integrity and durability coupled 
with significant risk reduction in terms of fire and life loses.  
Chapter 2 describes the background of the marine applications of the composite materials, 
while presenting the potential marine applications of marine composites and the current state of 
art. Additionally, it represents the two most important projects that occur with numerous of    
parties of different fields. 
Chapter 3 describes the requirements for fire safety at sea, presenting the SOLAS rules and of 
course the regulations of the most significant and well reputing class societies. Additionally, the 
Visby class vessel, the biggest existing vessel constructed from composites, is reviewed.  
Moreover it is attempted the analysis of the SOLAS’ Regulation 17 taking into account both 
the engineering analysis and the risk assessment, through the first approved alternative design of 
a composite hatch cover in the commercial vessel named Oshima. 
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2. FIBRE REINFORCED POLYMERS USE ON VESSELS 
 
The applications for composite materials are extensive, covering all types of end-uses, 
markets, and applications: military, defense, aerospace, automotive, sporting goods equipment, 
medical applications, electronics, conductivity, utility poles, household appliances, storage tanks, 
beams, drive shafts, engine components, bearings, seals, furniture, etc. The list is endless. Most 
importantly, the composites are used to replace monolithic materials (especially metals), to save 
weight and energy, to reduce part count and assembly cost, and because of the versatility of the 
interaction between the design of the materials and the design of the component (Greene 1990). 
Naval architects are rapidly accepting the latest construction techniques using composites to 
benefit from the following advantages: 
 
 Very low weight 
-enables increased speed 
-increases payload 
-reduces fuel consumption 
  
 Fire performance -interior panels prevent flame spread and smoke emission 
  
 Low Stiffness 
 
-the constructions of FRP are flexible 
 
 Corrosion resistance 
- Fibrous material does not corrode, do not rot and generally 
not altered in any way if exposed, for a sufficiently long time, 
in seawater or air 
 Durability 
 
-excellent fatigue impact and environmental resistance 
 
  
 Improved appearance -integral decorative facings can be incorporated 
  
 Rapid fitting 
-large and complicated structures can be fabricated in one 
piece  
  
 Versatile -wide range of design possibilities to suit circumstances 
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2.1. Marine Applications of Composite Materials 
 
The use of polymeric composites in a marine environment is well established. Applications 
range from pleasure boats and military vessels to helicopter decks on offshore platforms, and one 
of the main reasons for using these materials is their good resistance to harsh environmental 
conditions (Hanson and Crowe 1988). 
However, although much qualitative data and experience now exist, the transfer of this 'know 
how' into quantified design rules is proving to be a long process. The multiplicity of resins, 
fibers, test conditions and environments makes generalizations very hazardous and the time 
scales necessary to validate predictions for particular systems are too long for most research 
projects. If the fire safety factors associated with aging uncertainties are to be reduced it is 
essential that existing data be pooled so that design tools can be developed more rapidly. The use 
of composites in underwater applications is increasing, with recent examples in submarine 
structures, wellhead protection structures for the offshore industry and oceanographic equipment. 
In reviewing technology advances through the centuries, it is evident that materials 
development plays a key role in significant technology breakthroughs. If one but reflects on 
certain historical eras, materials have been either identified with the period or have been critical 
to resulting developments within the period. Included are the Stone Age, Iron Age, Industrial 
Revolution, Nuclear Age, and Electronic Revolution. Today, with the increasing need for 
performance-oriented material and structural systems, the development and introduction of 
advanced composite materials represents a new evolution in materials technology (Spandling 
1996). 
These new materials represent a marriage of diverse individual constituents, which, in 
combination, produce the potential for performance far exceeding that of the individual elements. 
This synergism makes composite materials both enabling and pervasive in government and 
commercial applications.  
FRP materials offer tremendous potential for applications in a marine environment, where 
their corrosion resistance and light weight are their principal advantages compared to metallic 
structures. Many applications exist and overviews are available. Considerable efforts have been 
made over the last 25 years to improve the understanding of the durability of these materials but 
design safety factors remain high for loadings other than static (long term, cyclic, impact). There 
is also a widespread mistrust of polymeric composites for fire-sensitive areas, in spite of 
considerable experience on passenger ferries in Scandinavia and increasing use offshore. 
The materials that are being considered for the majority of marine applications are not the 
high-performance carbon fiber composites, prepared by elevated temperature cure of prepeg 
layers, which have been adopted by the aerospace industry. Here, we are mainly concerned with 
glass fiber reinforced composites prepared by contact molding (hand lay-up). Typical fiber 
volume fractions are around 30-40%. There is also a little use of carbon fibers with epoxy resins 
and honeycomb core, confined to racing vessels and luxury boats where price is not an important 
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parameter in design. For tubes and tanks filament winding or contact molding are the main 
fabrication methods. In the figure 2.1 below the composites in ship machinery compartments are 
represented 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Applications for composites in ship machinery compartments (Mouritz 2001) 
 
Typical resins are polyesters, epoxies, vinyl esters and phenolics. The reinforcements are 
generally woven fabrics, often coupled with chopped strand mat layers. The ply-based analysis 
using laminate theory is therefore of limited use as unidirectional ply data are not available. In 
addition to the monolithic composite structures there are also a large number of applications of 
sandwich structures. The most frequently used core materials are closed cell PVC foams and 
balsa. These typically have densities from 80 to 200 kg/m3 but show poor fire resistance. Heavier 
mineral based cores may be the only solution when fire performance is critical. 
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2.1.1. Potential Applications of Marine Composites 
 
FRP composites potentially offer significant weight savings in surface warships and fast 
ferries and may be considered at a number of levels: 
 
1. Superstructures, as shown in figure 2.2, where depicted a French La Fayette-Class Frigate 
Composite Superstructure having composite materials to the forecastle, mast, stack and 
hangar. The construction materials are E-glass woven roving, polyester resin, balsa core, 
hand lay-up manufacturing the hangar structure uses a combination of sandwich panels and 
composite girders to provide the necessary strength and stiffness. 
2. Masts, as shown in figure 2.3. The mast has enclosed, conformal and mounted sensors 
installed to a composite structure and internal space frame  
3. Secondary hull structures (internal decks and bulkheads, fairings) 
4. Primary hull structure 
 
 
Figure 2.2. La Fayette frigates with the composite superstructure section. (Mouritz 2001) 
 
One concern regarding the use of composites for large ships hulls is reduced overall hull 
girder stiffness and the implication for propulsion shafting alignment. Interestingly, a US Navy 
study concluded that a hull bending stiffness of 25% of the steel baseline vessel could be 
achieved, and loads induced in the shafting by the cantilevered propeller would still be an order 
of magnitude higher that those caused by hull bending (Nguyem and Critchfield 1997). 
Although one of the often stated advantages of composites is the ability to form them into any 
shape, for large structures such as superstructures (Smith 1986) it can be more cost-effective in 
terms of the tooling to design a structure which is fabricated from flat panels, since a flat panel 
tool can be re-used many times and its cost amortized over many projects (Remen 1992). 
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Figure 2.3. USS Arthur W. Radford showing the AEM/S system. (Mouritz 2001) 
 
There are great benefits to be realized from employing composite materials in marine 
structures. When correctly specified, these materials offer ship operators a range of advantages 
over traditional metal structures, such as weight saving, durability, corrosion and fatigue 
resistance. Advances in closed mold processing technology and in particular the introduction of 
vacuum methods are leading to cleaner production and higher quality moldings. However, there 
is still a need to develop improved techniques for efficient and reliable joining and the question 
of end-of-life must be addressed (Cahill 1992). 
Materials tend to be the main cost driver when comparing composites with mild steel. The low 
Young's Modulus of Simple E-glass composites can be accommodated in hulls up to 85 meters in 
length (Mouritz 2001), so low cost hull mold concepts are now needed. Composites will continue 
to expand in use and be specified for smaller but complex shaped parts where steel and aluminum 
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fabrication cost is high, such as bow fairings, rudders Creswell 1997), funnels and even trimaran 
outriggers. The ability to design the material and combine structural reinforcements with other 
materials is giving rise to new and advanced concepts for improved stealth of warships' topsides 
structure. 
FRP composites are now established as marine construction materials, their long term 
behavior are well understood and by following a logical approach to analysis, testing and trials as 
designs are developed, highly durable and cost-effective ship structures result. 
 
2.2. Applications in Shipbuilding Industry 
 
There is an increasing worldwide demand for small, low signature, long range/endurance, and 
low cost ships, for close inshore operations. The optimum size of such a ship is still evolving but 
ships in the range of 300-foot long and 1200-ton displacement would appear to be representative 
of the class (Mouring 1998). However, efforts to actually incorporate FRP into ship construction 
have been hampered by a perception of high risk in using a structural material without an 
established history and the fact that the use of metallic materials, specifically steel, has been very 
successful (Hepburn 1991, The Eridan class 1991). Equally difficult is the design of an efficient 
connection. It represents one of the major challenges in the development of composite structures. 
The capacity of a structure is often limited by the capacity of its connection. 
 
2.2.1. Pleasure Boat Industry 
 
Small pleasure boats have been built from composites for over fifty years. The principal 
fabrication route is hand lay-up, using glass/polyester composites, although there is some interest 
in injection methods such as Resin Transfer Molding (RTM) for larger series. Competing 
materials are wood and aluminum but price and ease of maintenance have resulted in composites 
representing around 90% of the market. Especially, the small boat industry is dominated by 
fiberglass, since this material allows relatively fast, inexpensive mass production in comparison 
with the other materials. Large boats and ships are not mass-produced at sufficient levels to yield 
a significant construction advantage to fiberglass; thus there is more disparity in the choice of 
materials. A significant innovation in this area is the growing awareness of the benefits of quality 
control procedures (Scott 1973). 
 
2.2.2. Passenger Transport 
  
There is an increasing number of fast passenger vessels under construction and the design of 
such vessels will be used to illustrate the origins of safety factors in design. Vessels transporting 
passengers in international waters are subjected to Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations 
issued by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which severely restrict the materials 
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options. For large ships the hull and most bulkheads must be non-inflammable, thus excluding 
polymeric composites. For smaller boats and fishing vessels the rules are less strict. In Sweden 
and Norway sandwich construction is widely used for fast passenger transport (Enlund, 
Sjoldclass 1999, Warship Technology 1999). 
IMO SOLAS Chapter II Rule 11 requires that the hull, superstructure, structural bulkheads, 
decks and deckhouses be built from steel or equivalent materials. Introduced in July 2002, 
Chapter II Rule 17 allows alternative construction materials to be used where it can be proved 
they offer the same level of safety as if the prescriptive rules requiring non-combustible materials 
had been followed. The IMO High Speed Craft code requires that “fire restricting” materials are 
used when construction is not steel or equivalent. The significance of this is that, although a 
complex safety case has to be assembled for vessels with a FRP composite superstructure built to 
SOLAS Chapter II, there is an established groundwork in place within the High Speed Craft to 
guide the verification of fire performance.  
The safety philosophy of the regulations for highspeed craft (HSC) is based on the 
management and reduction of risk as well as the traditional philosophy of passive protection in 
the event of an accident. Management of risk through accommodation arrangements, active 
safety systems, restricted operation, quality management and human factor engineering should be 
considered in evaluating safety equivalent to current conventions. The application of 
mathematical analysis to assess risk and determine the validity of safety measures is encouraged. 
The regulations take into account that a high-speed craft is of a light displacement compared with 
a conventional ship. This displacement aspect is the essential parameter to obtain fast and 
competitive sea transportation and consequently the regulations allow for use of non-
conventional shipbuilding materials, provided that a safety standard at least equivalent to 
conventional ships is achieved. To clearly distinguish such craft, criteria based on speed and 
volumetric Froude number have been used to delineate those craft to which these regulations 
apply from other, more conventional, craft. The HSC code applies to passenger crafts which do 
not proceed in the course of their voyage more than 4 h at operational speed from a place of 
refuge when fully laden and cargo crafts of 500 gross tonnage and upwards which do not proceed 
in the course of their voyage more than 8 h at operational speed from a place of refuge when fully 
laden. The HSC code is an alternative to SOLAS in those areas, and drafted to be more suitable 
for High Speed Craft which operate in coastal waters and rely on shore based maintenance.  
 
2.2.3. Commercial Applications 
 
The use of fiberglass construction in the commercial marine industry has flourished over time 
for a number of different reasons. Cost is a major concern in commercial shipbuilding because of 
international competition. Commercial shipbuilding has virtually ceased in the U.S. Initially, 
long-term durability and favorable fabrication economics were the impetus for using FRP. More 
recently, improved vessel performance through weight reduction has encouraged its use. Since 
15 
 
the early 1960's, a key factor that makes FRP construction attractive is the reduction of labor 
costs when multiple vessels are fabricated from the same mold. Composites have only been used 
in the U.S. when economically viable or required for performance. Composite usage has 
extended to fishing trawlers, lifeboats, passenger ferries, and larger ships such as cargo ships and 
tankers. 
Industrial submersibles for research and inspection have also used composites to help them 
achieve their requirements (Horsmon 2001). 
 
2.2.4. Military Applications 
 
The most significant naval application of fiber-reinforced plastics has been in construction of 
Mine CounterMeasure Vessels (MCMV)(Brown 1990). The first GRP hull was first conceived 
by the U. S. Navy in 1946 with contracts for two 8.5 m personnel boats. GRP use then spread to 
utility and patrol boats. There are only limited applications on larger surface ships and 
submarines, but many feasibility and engineering studies are being conducted. (Bernhard) 
Growth of composite uses on naval vessels has been hindered by stringent performance 
requirements and the need to keep cost to a minimum. Specific requirements include noise, 
shock, ballistic protection, radar/sonar capabilities, and fire performance (Sjorgen 1984). 
  
2.3. Current State of Art 
 
From the end of the wooden ship era of the 19th century, steel has been the main ship building 
material, as shown in the figure 2.4 as well. During the past 20-30 years there have been a great 
many developments in lightweight construction. The most of them are for military purposes and 
not for passenger vessels. During this period the use of fibre reinforced polymer composites in 
the ship building industry has steadily increased. Civilian applications include not only high 
speed vessels but also significant parts of the superstructures of large passenger ships. Military 
applications include mine hunters, fast patrol craft and superstructures of larger naval ships. 
Recently, pioneering lightweight solutions involving such features as adhesive bonding and novel 
types of sandwich construction have been the focus of further research and development. Some of 
these developments are based on innovative use of steel as well as the more usual lightweight 
materials. The areas of application have been extended to include more components of 
conventional ships, such as moveable car decks and ramps. Generally the aims are to improve 
safety and reliability in addition to saving weight and increasing efficiency of fabrication and 
maintenance (Wenström 2008). 
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Figure 2.4. From wood to light weight (Wenström 2008) 
 
 
2.3.1. Composites in Ships 
 
There is great potential to use more composite materials in ships. We are seeing a sharp 
increase in the use of composites because of the weight reductions that can be achieved, and 
resultant fuel reduction. 
The leisure marine sector has been using FRP composites for over 50 years. Rising bunker 
prices mean that reduced fuel use is becoming more critical in ships, and the benefits to ship 
stability by reducing topside weight are very significant. Alternatively, reduced structural weight 
can allow for higher payload / more cabins in a cruise ship, or can increase top speed. 
The weight reduction we typically associate with replacing traditional materials with 
composites has different implications for ships. Of course fuel saving is an advantage, but despite 
the fluctuating price of oil, the increase in payload gained by structural weight savings tends to be 
more attractive and have a shorter payback. Ships are limited to about 290 m length and 32 m 
beam if they are to be able to pass through the locks on the Panama Canal. Most ports would 
involve similar limits. So to increase capacity in cruise ships, the only way is up and the 
structural mass above the waterline increasingly affects the ship’s stability. Hence lighter 
structural materials allow for a bigger superstructure with greater capacity. 
A Swedish research project, LASS-C, looked at replacing the superstructure of cruise ship 
Norwegian Gem in composite. The payback period for the extra structural cost if anyone took the 
fuel savings gained from the weight reduction was 5.9 years, but the payback from income from 
the extra cabins you could build for the same overall weight was 2.5 years. Likewise the payback 
on cargo ships is quicker if you consider the potential extra payload rather than the fuel savings. 
For naval ships, the flexibility of the plat-form, the potential for extra weaponry and increased 
speed are all attractions which can be gained through topside weight reduction as well as reduced 
fuel consumption or increased range.  
Corrosion resistance is an obvious advantage of composites over steel in a marine 
environment. In addition, for military customers, the potential to incorporate smart functionality 
and reduce magnetic, radar and infra-red signatures is of interest. The improved thermal and 
acoustic insulation properties of FRP are significant in many applications, for example, cruise 
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ship balconies where thermal bridging is a problem, cabin partitions where noise transfer must be 
minimized. 
One very practical potential application is a hatch cover which has been developed by Oshima 
Shipyard. These bulk carrier hatch covers are 17 m by 8 m for each half and would weigh 36 tons 
in steel, but just 12 tons in GRP. Most of the top reasons for insurance claims for damage to 
cargo are related to hatch covers – problems with seals, corrosion, etc. The GRP covers would 
reduce many of these problems, and allow for smaller, electric motors and lighter craneage. The 
structural design by Norwegian consultant Ragnar Hansen has been given approval in principle 
by DNV-GL and is now seeking formal approval in relation to the fire risk assessment. 
A huge problem in steel ships is corrosion in ballast tanks. The tanks are integral to the 
structure of the hull, so structural beams pass through them, creating complex surfaces that are 
very difficult to maintain. A fully composite structure could solve this problem, but to suggest a 
composite hull for a large ship is a big step from where we are now. 
Composites are already used in commercial ships in several applications including: masts and 
radomes, bathroom modules, lockers, lifeboats, pipe work. Complete composite valve and pipe-
work systems are available which have a major benefit in terms of corrosion resistance for 
seawater cooling systems. Superstructures for several naval ships have been built in composites 
in recent years, including two Zumwalt class destroyers for the US Navy; the Steregushchy Class 
corvettes and a stealth frigate, Admiral Gorshkov, for the Russian Navy; two corvettes for the 
Indian Navy. 
The Indian corvette superstructures were built by Kockums naval shipyard in Sweden and 
followed the fully composite Visby class corvettes ‘built of sandwich-construction carbon fiber 
rein-forced plastic (CFRP). The material provides high strength and rigidity, low weight, good 
shock resistance, low radar signature and low magnetic signature. The material dramatically 
reduces the structural weight (typically 50% of a conventional steel hull). This results in a higher 
payload carrying capability, higher speed or longer range.’ 
On the other hand, a major obstacle to the structural use of composites in ships is their 
combustibility. SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) regulations require structural materials in ships to 
be non-combustible, unless "equivalence" can be demonstrated through a complex process. It is 
still a considerable obstacle to overcome, although a significant improvement has been achieved 
the last decades. 
However, the excellent thermal insulating properties of composites could in many situations 
reduce the spread of fire. Indeed composites are used to protect steel structures from fire in some 
offshore installations. Thus suggestions have been made to IMO committees as to how to allow 
for the use of composites with appropriate assessment. 
The composites generally are made out of two or more different materials, as explained 
detailed in the figure 2.5, combined to form a single structure with an identifiable interface. One 
of the earliest known composite materials is the adobe brick in which straw -fibrous material- is 
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mixed with mud or clay an adhesive with strong compressive strength. Composite ships end up 
saving money in the long run by cutting down on maintenance and repairs. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Composite layers (Wenstrom 2008) 
 
All the above don’t mean that the composites don’t come with their share of problems. They 
are flammable, and once aflame they create toxic smoke. Fire is a very real hazard for ocean 
going ships. You cannot evacuate and have people stand in the car park while the fire is put out. 
If you are several days from port, the fire must be contained if major risk to life and property 
is to be avoided. Steel does not burn and stays stronger for longer in a fire than FRP, but it will 
ultimately collapse. After one hour of the ISO 834 standard fire temperature curve not insulated 
steel would retain about 5% of its strength and stiffness. Also it readily conducts heat, 
contributing to the spread of the fire, so the use of steel is dependent on good insulation. While 
FRPs have inherent combustibility due to their organic content, available materials have 
improved significantly in the last 20–30 years, as have fire protection systems. 
Several approaches have been developed to resist ignition and flame spread. However, 
composites lose strength at a lower temperature in a fire than steel does, though they can out-
perform aluminum structures which are accepted due to their non-combustibility. The critical 
factor for structural composites in fire is often to resist the collapse which would occur as the heat 
deflection temperature of the polymer is progressively exceeded through the thickness of the 
structure. In contrast to metals, composites are excellent insulators, so resist the spread of fire by 
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conduction through a structure. An engine room fire aboard the GRP Royal Navy mine hunter 
HMS Ledbury in 1983 burnt for several hours with no damage to adjacent compartments and no 
requirement for boundary cooling. The insulating properties of the structural laminates were 
sufficient to prevent either structural collapse or burn through. 
Composite panels are used for fire and blast protection on offshore oil rigs and have been 
engineered to provide two hours or more of protection against jet fire. Bruce McDonald at 
Lloyd’s Register represents the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) on 
the IMO Correspondence Group. He said that a major reason why he wants to progress the area is 
because composites have made oil rigs safer places. McDonald added: ‘FRP is not for everything, 
but there are benefits there. The materials technology is advancing and the fire risk can be 
mitigated. It depends on the right material choices. Prescriptive requirements are crude but 
effective, but with the current level of knowledge we have the capability to evaluate alternatives. 
Prescriptive regulations are looking backwards. We need to look forwards.’ 
 These safety-related issues are part of the reason why the industry has shied away from 
composites. One advantage of composites is that they do not transmit the heat from one side of 
the structure to the other. Meanwhile, for composites to be more widely accepted, the industry 
and the Navy still have to improve the process of joining composites with metal structures. They 
also have to figure out how to inspect and repair those composite structures if necessary.  
As easily anyone concludes, while composite technologies are still rapidly growing and 
developing into new markets, they have reached a level of maturity, particularly in boatbuilding 
and aerospace. Issues such as durability and repair are now well attested. The current program to 
refit the Royal Navy’s Hunt class mine hunters is a good example. Their 60 m GRP hulls built in 
the late 1970s and 80s remain in excellent condition with a life of in excess of 50 years expected. 
The IMO Correspondence Group developing guidelines for FRP in ships is making progress, 
though the outcome is unclear as there is reluctance amongst some members to allow Regulation 
17 to be used to justify an alternative to the prescriptive non-combustibility requirement. 
Philippe Noury of DNV-GL in Norway has been involved in research and in classification of 
marine composites for many years. Referring to the High Speed Craft (HSC) Code, he points out 
that ‘FRP composite high speed vessels have been operated for about 25 years and have a 
positive service experience with respect to fire safety. Indeed, there has not been any serious fire 
disaster or frequent fire incident for this segment. This proves that regulations work, that active 
and passive fire protection systems in place are efficient and reliable, and that the industry has 
plenty of solid practical experience and solutions ready to be used for large commercial ships. 
We are not starting from scratch. This adds to the lessons learned from the last 10 years of R&D 
on the use of FRP composites on large commercial ships. 
Tommy Hertzberg of SP Fire Research in Sweden is engaging with the European 
Commission’s interest in standardizing test and certification procedures for fire behavior of 
composite materials on vessels. This could facilitate the use of composites in passenger vessels 
and inland waterway and short sea shipping. Hertzberg believes that the fire test requirements of 
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the HSC Code could be adapted to cover short sea and inland waterway craft as the fire risk 
issues are comparable. Tommy Hertzberg is also the chair of E-LASS, 3 a European network for 
lightweight structures at sea. As such he led a drive to encourage the national authorities to 
support the work of the IMO Correspondence Group in early 2014. The E-LASS letter was 
supported by 85 organizations from across the world, indicating the strong interest in opening up 
a way to see the benefits of FRP. Perhaps most influential in pulling through change are the ship-
owners and ship-builders. As they see the economic benefits of using composites, which tend 
also to translate to environmental benefits, regulators will have to ensure that the systems are in 
place to assess the safe use of composites. 
Mike Collier of Carnival presented to national representatives at the IMO Maritime Safety 
Committee in November 2014, expressing that Carnival, the world’s largest cruise ship operator, 
is very keen to see the development of lightweight materials, particularly to reduce the weight of 
cabins and their contents. The interest shown by Oshima in developing the hatch cover is 
important, as is involvement in composite research projects of several European shipyards, 
including Meyer Werft and Fincantieri.  
 
2.3.2. The LASS Project (www.s-lass.com, Hertzberg 2009) 
 
The project “Lightweight construction applications at sea”, LASS, has between January 2005 
and June 2008, been focused on developing practical methodologies for using lightweight 
constructions partly or wholly for the design of six different objects: five ships and one offshore 
living quarter module. Originally, the LASS project group consisted of twenty parties from 
different fields: ship owners, ship yards, material manufacturers, ship designers, military marine 
industry, different ship organisations and a research group from universities and institutes. 
However, the LASS group later expanded to include a total of twenty-nine organisations (see 
Figure 2.6). 
 
21 
 
 
Figure 2.6. The LASS consortium (Hertzberg 2009) 
 
More structured, the consortium is described by organisation-blocks in Figure 2.7. Kockums, 
the Swedish ship yard situated in Karlskrona on the Swedish east coast, was an important part of 
the research group as they were responsible for two of the total of six work packages that studied 
redesigned lightweight objects. They are, however, for clarity of organisations situated in the ship 
yard block in Figure 2.6. 
22 
 
 
Figure 2.7. The LASS consortium (Hertzberg 2009) 
 
The lightweight construction materials used in LASS are aluminium, with the possibility of 
forming structured elements and sandwich construction material consisting of two fibre-
reinforced polymer (FRP) laminate on each side of a core of lightweight PVC foam, as are shown 
in Figure 2.8 
 
Figure 2.8. Lightweight materials used in LASS (Hertzberg 2009) 
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The main target for investigation was originally conceptual studies of the four different 
vessels, depicted in Figure 2.9.  
The original ships used were (from top left in Figure 2.9):  
1. A 199 meter, RoRo vessel Objective: Switch the steel deck house to an aluminium 
construction  
2. An 88 meter, high speed catamaran Objective: Exchange this wholly aluminium 
construction into an aluminium construction with an FRP composite superstructure  
3.  A 188 meter, RoPax vessel Objective: Exchange the steel for FRP composite in the 
superstructure  
4.  A 24 meter, Swedish troop carrying vessel Objective: Transform the aluminium troop 
vessel into an FRP composite passenger HSC  
RoRo vessels and container ships are the dominant form of intermodal transport today. RoRo 
traffic can be divided into traffic with load carriers (trucks, trailers and semitrailers) and transport 
of (newly-manufactured) vehicles and also passengers (RoPax). Coastal Ro-Ro traffic is exposed 
to considerable competition from road and rail in terms of quality, transport time and cost. It is 
difficult for ship transport to compete in terms of transport times, and so it tends to compete on 
the basis of the combination of load capacity and transport time. Reducing the superstructure 
weight of Ro-Ro vessels increases their cargo capacity, reduces the need for ballast and reduces 
fuel costs, which in turn improve competitiveness. In addition, and by no means least, a 
lightweight superstructure is expected to reduce maintenance costs. Many modern RoPax vessels 
are also constructed close to the stability limit and therefore there is an interest in a lighter 
superstructure.  
The RoRo vessel used in this study is a “Panamax” type of vessel, i.e., it has a maximum 
width that enables the ship to pass through the Panama channel. A lighter superstructure could 
provide the possibility to increase the number of decks, without inducing stability problems. A 
particularly interesting part of this study was the use of extruded aluminium profiles for the 
construction.  
The catamaran, STENA Carisma, used in the study is already an advanced lightweight craft 
and it was when constructed in the 1990’s, the world’s largest aluminium vessel. The main 
interest now was to investigate if a further weight reduction would be possible using FRP 
composites in the superstructure.  
The passenger HSC vessel is interesting as there is a need for new, lightweight HSC for 
passenger transport in Europe. New rules within the EU for passenger ships require higher leak 
stability than before, which will force ship owners to invest in new vessels. 
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Figure 2.9. Ships used for investigation of lightweight constructions in LASS (Hertzberg 2009) 
 
The LASS consortia expanded with nine additional members after initiation. The reason for 
the expansion was the introduction of complementary expertise from the insulating material 
industry, but also to be able to expand the conceptual study to include a 89 meter dry cargo 
freight vessel with main objective to exchange steel superstructure and hatches for FRP sandwich 
and a 350 tn steel offshore living quarter (LQ) module construction in order to investigate the 
possibility of  exchanging steel construction for aluminium, as shown in figure 2.10. 
 The expansion with two new concept objects took place in 2006. The main reasons for the 
expansion were interest from the industry and the fact that the structures are very interesting 
targets for a lightweight construction concept.  
The cargo vessel is a typical ship used for in-land channel transport. Often such vessels cannot 
use their full load capacity due to restrictions from channels and sluices. Their geometry might 
very well be size-optimised based on the smallest sluice on the expected route of travel. The dry 
cargo vessel used in the project was a “Troll-max” type of vessel, i.e., was optimised to pass 
through the Trollhätte channel. Any weight saving of the ship structure could therefore 
potentially be directly exchanged for pay load.  
The offshore LQ module is interesting since many technical obstacles and fire requirements 
are similar for the offshore and ship industry and hence, there is a potential for technology 
exchange. There is also an increased concern from the offshore industry about platform weights. 
This is related to the need for more active components on the platform, e.g. drilling equipment, as 
it has become economically viable to drill deeper than before. Therefore, when new platforms are 
made or old ones are being reconstructed, lightweight construction material is asked for.  
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It should be noted that the only two LASS concepts that need to tackle the new SOLAS 
regulation 17 is the RoPax ship and the freight ship as HSCs are allowed to use combustible 
materials as long as they are “fire restricting”. However, as mentioned earlier there was a lack of 
certified construction elements prior to the LASS project. Aluminium is allowed on SOLAS 
vessels as they are part of the family “steel or equivalent material” 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Added concept studies for the 2006 expanded LASS project (Hertzberg 2009) 
 
The main targets of the mentioned project were the design of 6 lightweight objects used at sea 
and also provide demonstration of technical solutions and practical methodologies for 30% 
lighter objects at 25% lower total cost compared to a conventional steel construction. 
LASS project was containing a large number of fire tests. The objective of each test has 
always been one of the following three:  
1. To investigate basic material fire properties  
2. To obtain data for simulations  
3. To prepare for or to certify fire safe constructions.  
A particular difficulty is that the IMO do not define constructions to test in the large scale 
furnace other than those made of steel or aluminium. The philosophy used in LASS was always 
to test a “worst case” construction in order to create a situation where a, from a fire safety 
perspective, “better” construction could be accepted without testing. Through such an approach, 
the obtained certificates can be used for many types of constructions which will facilitate the 
building of composite ships. 
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As a result of this project, aluminum is more easily acceptable for shipbuilding than 
composites by authorities and classification societies as it is already in use for HSC and 
passenger vessels. It is also part of the material group entitled by SOLAS “steel or equivalent 
materials” (chapter II-2 Reg 11), accepted for ship building. In the project it has been used for the 
design of a deckhouse on a RoRo vessel and off-shore living quarters. In the process, discussions 
with the classification society Germanische Lloyd regarding class rules for strength requirements 
on such a deck house, made it possible to optimize the design based on FEM calculations using 
relevant loads. The extruded profile also made it possible to lower the deck house weight 
drastically. 
Aluminum was also used when designing a new offshore living quarter’s construction that 
showed very promising results. Unfortunately, the construction was not fully completed, due to a 
reconstruction of the participating industry and WP-leader Pharmadule-Emtunga. 
Much of the work in LASS has involved composites as this material was used in four out of 
six investigated objects. Composites also introduce the biggest challenges since they are not 
considered “steel or equivalent material”, i.e. they are not allowed to be used on a SOLAS vessel, 
and at least not when the prescriptive SOLAS code is used as the basis for approval. Using the 
new regulation 17, however, it is possible provided safety can be demonstrated. 
A focal point for the project has therefore been to demonstrate and certify fire safe composite 
construction elements for ships (deck, bulkhead, door and window in bulkhead, deck and 
bulkhead penetration constructions). More than a dozen have been tested and certified as part of 
the LASS project. Thanks to this, it is now possible to actually build a high speed craft (HSC) in 
FRP-composites in accordance with the HSC-code. The certified construction elements also 
provide a basis for the methodology developed for equivalent safety acceptance for SOLAS 
vessels in accordance with SOLAS regulation 17. 
 
2.3.3. The Euclid Rtp3.21 Project (McGeorge 2002) 
 
 “Survivability, durability and performance of naval composite structures” is a large European 
co-operative project with 24 partners from 6 European countries, which was started in March 
2000 and completed in March 2003. The project involved research institutions, material suppliers 
and shipyards, and had a total budget of 9.2 MEURO. The full list of project partners is as 
follows (with national lead companies underlined):  
Norway: Det Norske Veritas AS(overall coordinator), Umoe Mandal as, FiReCo  as 
Denmark: Risø National Laboratory, FORCE Institute, Dany ard Aalborg 
Italy: CETENA, Fincantieri, SI R Industriale, IDS, CSI, OTOBREDA  
France: DCN, DCE, Ifreme r, MEDYS YS, AI A-CP  
Netherlands: TNO, Royal Schelde  
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U.K.: 
DERA, BAE Systems, Vosper Thornycroft, Newcastle University,    
University of Southampton 
 
The overall objective of this project was to strengthen the technological basis for the large-
scale application of fibre-reinforced composite materials to naval vessels and structures. The 
superstructure of a frigate-sized naval vessel with a traditional steel hull has been chosen as the 
application case, and the major threats to such a structure are considered. These include internal 
and external blast and weapon-induced fires. Major advantages offered by a composite 
superstructure construction include reduced weight, reduced signatures and higher payload.  
The IMO requirements to fire reaction of the surface materials adopted for comparison of 
promising systems. This also allows the use of commercial off the shelf fire protection systems 
and provides a level of safety in peacetime operations not inferior to that of civilian vessels. In 
addition to assessing the fire resistance of a protected structure subject to typical industrial fires 
as required by the IMO code, also the resistance to a typical hydrocarbon fire is assessed. 
Furthermore, it was investigated the effect of typical damage, from blast and fragments from a 
detonating warhead, on the fire resistance. This shed light on whether particular measures to 
repair such damage need be integrated in the firefighting strategy. To provide some basis for 
comparison between steel and composite structures, the propagation of a severe fire in a realistic 
structure studied experimentally by a full-scale fire tests on a composite corridor and a typical 
steel corridor. A quite relevant scenario with a severe fire in one end of the corridor adopted. 
After completion of the corridor fire tests, the fires extinguished to provide information on the 
efficiency of typical firefighting measures. Altogether, these activities identified adequate passive 
fire protection systems and provide information about phenomena of particular relevance for 
naval ships. The ultimate goal was to establish a design with the passive systems evaluated in the 
RTP3.21 project that was not more vulnerable to blast, fragments and potentially long lasting 
fires than a traditional steel structure. This also required that adequate active measures to be 
adopted.  
The conclusions of the fire test programme, which was conducted as part of a three-year 
European collaborative research project undertaken under the auspices of the EUCLID 
programme (EUCLID project RTP3.21) were that the FRP sandwich structures can be used with 
confidence in naval ship structures provided that the fire fighting strategy is adapted to account 
for the particular properties of such structures. Considering the reaction-to-fire properties of 
vinylester-based sandwich structures and the fact that the position of a hit cannot be predicted, 
one of the conclusions of the EUCLID RTP3.21 project was that it is necessary to protect from 
the fire this type of material in all the areas on board a naval ship.  
Another inference that was extracted was that the reaction-to-fire properties of the fire 
protections are strongly influenced by their very surface, i.e. by the behavior of the decorative 
layer applied for aesthetic and/or protection purpose on the surface of the fire protection. Some 
fire protections may show very good behavior when tested without decorative coating, but their 
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properties may decrease significantly when coated by a decorative surface. Therefore, the 
protections should be selected carefully.  
The fire test programme reached a conclusion, that on the one hand for areas of low fire 
hazard, the thin phenolic-based fire protection used in this project seems sufficient to protect a 
vinylester-based sandwich structure. In case of flashover, the fire can be extinguished easily from 
the outside through a small opening.  
On the other hand for areas of major fire hazard, the 60 mm-thick phenolic-based fire 
protection has proved to be very effective in protecting the vinylester/balsa sandwich structures. 
All the structures withstood the fire load longer than expected. In particular, a stiffened sandwich 
deck exposed to a hydrocarbon fire was able to withstand the mechanical load without collapsing 
for one and a half hour.  
In addition, through the test was proved that once the joints are protected correctly, then they 
are not a weak point in the structure.  
Last but not least, an adequate level of survivability in case of fire arising from a “wartime” 
scenario can be achieved: this will be even improved when an active fire fighting strategy is 
performed. 
 
2.3.4. Passive Fire Protection for Composite Vessels  
 
For naval vessels, there are currently no international fire regulations. Numerous test standards 
and acceptance criteria are used in the various Navies, but many tests methods are not made for 
and hence not suitable for testing of composite materials. However, some navies look to the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code of Safety for High Speed Craft (HSC-code) for 
fire reaction requirements for composite structures (heat release, smoke etc.). The following 
section summarize the state of the art for passive fire protection of composite structures, and give 
practical examples on how the HSC-code criteria can be fulfilled in a rational and cost efficient 
way. These sections also summarize 10 years of research and product development related to 
passive fire protection of composite vessels. Fire protection and structural efficiency must be 
evaluated as a total concept, not as individual parts. This is important, as selection of fire 
protection of a composite vessel is heavily influenced by the thermo mechanical and fire reaction 
properties of the structural materials (McGeorge 2002). 
 
2.3.4.1. Materials for Passive Fire Protection of Composite Structures (McGeorge 2002) 
 
During the early stages of a fire, the fire reaction properties (heat release, spread of flame, 
smoke production, etc.) of the materials surrounding the initial fire are of highest importance. 
Easily ignitable materials will reduce the time to a possible flashover, usually produce much 
smoke, and hence decrease the chance of extinguishing the fire. This is especially important for 
weapon-induced fires, as the temperature/flux rise on surfaces can be rather instant and have high 
29 
 
levels. If the fire is not extinguished before flashover condition, the fire should be kept within a 
fire zone by fire-resisting divisions that, in addition to fire insulation and smoke tightness, must 
maintain load-bearing integrity. Test Method and Requirements to Fire Reaction, according to 
IMO, has specific requirements to fire reaction properties for a Fire Restricting Material (FRM). 
To qualify as a FRM, the material or material combination must have the following properties: 
1. They should have low flame spread characteristics;  
2. Limited heat flux, due regard being paid to the risk of ignition of furniture in the     
compartment;  
3. Limited rate of heat release, due regard being paid to the risk of spread of flame to an 
adjacent compartment; and  
4. Gas and smoke should not be emitted in quantities that could be dangerous to the occupants 
of the craft.  
The test method for bulkheads, walls and ceiling liner materials is the ISO 9705 “Fire tests – 
Full scale room test for surface products” – often named the “Room-Corner”-test. The test room 
is a typical full sized cabin 3.6 x 2.4 x 2.4 m (l x w x h). The test specimen covers all surfaces 
except the wall with the “doorway”. A propane burner is located on the floor in one corner, and 
gives a heat output of 100 kW for 10 minutes, followed by 300 kW for 10 minutes. The product 
to be tested must be in “end use” condition, i.e. joints, fixation etc. must be representative to the 
mounting in the vessel, and, of very high importance, and the surface must be as installed on the 
vessel in service. IMO HSC-code criteria are given in Resolution MSC.40(64) – “Standard for 
Qualifying Marine Materials for High Speed Craft as Fire-Restricting Materials”. Limits are 
given for peak and average heat release, peak and average smoke production, spread of flame, 
and flaming “drops or debris”. 
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3. REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRE SAFETY ON BOARD 
 
3.1. SOLAS Standards (Mustain, B., Kim, M., Porter, W. R., Prager, M., Stavovy, A., Sandberg, 
W., Wilson, A., Stiansen, S. G. (1990)) 
 
SOLAS is the standard that all passenger ships built or converted after 1984 must meet. 
Chapter II-2 Fire Protection, Fire Detection and Fire Extinction define minimum fire standards 
for the industry. SOLAS divides ships into three class divisions and requires different levels of 
fire protection, detection and extinction. Each class division is measured against a standard fire 
test. This test is one in which specimens of the relevant bulkheads or decks are exposed in a fire 
test furnace to temperatures corresponding approximately to the Standard Time-Temperature 
Curve of ASTM El 19, which is shown in Figure 3.1 along with other standards. The standard 
time-temperature curve for this purpose is developed by a smooth curve drawn through the 
following temperature points measured above the initial furnace temperature: 
 at the end of the first 5 minutes 556°C (1032oF) 
 at the end of the frost 10 minutes 659°C (1218oF) 
 at the end of the first 15 minutes 718°C (1324oF) 
 at the end of the first 30 minutes 821“C (1509oF) 
 at the end of the first 60 minutes 925-C (1697oF) 
 
Figure 3.1. Comparisons of Three Fire Tests (Ship Structure Committee 1990) 
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Non-combustible materials are identified for use in construction and insulation in all three 
class divisions. Non-combustible material is a material which neither burns nor gives off 
flammable vapors in sufficient quantity for self-ignition when heated to approximately 750
o
C 
(282
o
F), this being determined to the satisfaction of the administration by an established test 
procedure. Any other material is a combustible material. 
The actual class divisions are A, B, and C. “A” class divisions are those divisions formed by 
bulkheads and decks which: 
a. shall be constructed of steel 
b. shall be suitably stiffened 
c. shall be so constructed as to be capable of preventing the passage of smoke and flame to the     
end of the one-hour standard fire test 
d. shall be insulated with approved non-combustible materials such that the average 
temperature of the unexposed side will not rise more than 139
o
C (282
 o
F) above the original 
temperature, nor will the temperature, at any one point, including any joint rise more than 
180
 o
C (356
 o
F) above the original temperature, within the time listed below: 
 Class “A-60” 60 minutes 
 Class “A-30” 30 minutes 
 Class “A-15” 15 minutes  
 Class “A-O”   O minutes 
“B” class divisions are those divisions formed by bulkheads, decks, ceilings or linings which 
comply with the following:  
a. shall be constructed as to be capable of preventing the passage of smoke and flame to the 
end of the first half hour standard fire tests 
b. shall have an insulation value such that the average temperature of the unexposed side will 
not rise more than 130’C (282”F) above the original temperature, nor will the temperature 
at any point, including any joint, rise more than 225
o
C (437
 o
F) above the original 
temperature, within the time listed below: 
 Class “B-15” 15 minutes 
 Class “B-O”   O minutes 
c. they shall be constructed of approved non-combustible materials and all materials entering   
into the construction and erection of “B” class divisions shall be non-combustible, with the 
exception that combustible veneers may be permitted provided they meet other 
requirements of the chapter. 
In table 3.2 below are shown the Heat Release Rates and Ignition Fire Test Data for several 
composite materials. The first column presents the material in three different values of applied 
heat flux burned in specific furnace, which of them corresponds to one value of heat release rate 
with relevant ignition time. 
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Table 3.2. Heat Release Rates and Ignition Fire Test Data for Composite Materials (Hughes 
Associates, Heat Release Rates and Ignition Fire Test Data for Representative Building and 
Composite Materials) 
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3.2. SOLAS Rules for Fire Safety on Board (SOLAS Consolidated Edition 2009) 
 
The SOLAS Convention in its successive forms is generally regarded as the most important of 
all international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships. The first version was adopted in 
1914, in response to the Titanic disaster, the second in 1929, the third in 1948, and the fourth in 
1960. The 1974 version includes the tacit acceptance procedure - which provides that an 
amendment shall enter into force on a specified date unless, before that date, objections to the 
amendment are received from an agreed number of Parties. Unless expressly provided otherwise, 
the present regulations apply only to ships engaged on international voyages. 
The main objective of the SOLAS Convention is to specify minimum standards for the 
construction, equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their safety. Flag States are 
responsible for ensuring that ships under their flag comply with its requirements, and a number of 
certificates are prescribed in the Convention as proof that this has been done. Control provisions 
also allow Contracting Governments to inspect ships of other Contracting States if there are clear 
grounds for believing that the ship and its equipment do not substantially comply with the 
requirements of the Convention - this procedure is known as port State control.  
In terms of this thesis the chapter II will be analyzed, providing all necessary information. 
The fire safety chapter in SOLAS is structured as illustrated in Figure 3.3. It comprises 3 parts 
and 7 regulations. The Part B contains the probability of ignition, fire growth potential and the 
smoke generation potential and toxicity part C containment of fire, firefighting and structural 
integrity and the last part D articulates the means of ecsape. The goals of the chapter are defined 
through stated fire safety objectives. For these to be achieved, a number of stated functional 
requirements are embodied in the following regulations of the chapter. Hence, the fire safety 
objectives and functional requirements are achieved by compliance with the prescriptive 
requirements. After the introductory regulations, follow regulations with prescriptive 
requirements covering different areas of fire safety, e.g. ignition, containment or fighting of fire. 
The particular area of fire safety is defined by a purpose statement at the beginning of each 
regulation. The purpose statement consists of a regulation objective and the functional 
requirements to be achieved by that regulation. Thereafter follow prescriptive requirements. 
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Figure 3.3. Each regulation in SOLAS II-2 consists of a purpose statement and prescriptive 
requirements. The purpose statements comprise regulation functional requirements and an 
individual regulation objective which sets out the objective of the functional requirements 
(Evegren 2015) 
 
The fire safety objectives and functional requirements of the fire safety chapter can be said to 
define fire safety, which hence also defines how safety is viewed and measured. This is further 
defined through the functional requirements in the regulations, in light of the regulation 
objectives. Therefore it is highly important to identify which functional requirements the base 
design may affect the achievement of. This is done by identifying deviations from prescriptive 
requirements and clarifying their purposes by recognizing the associated functional requirements. 
The functional requirements of the deviated prescriptive requirements can thereafter be used 
(along with the fire safety objectives) to define performance criteria. How well the performance 
criteria must be achieved is determined by how well a reference design, complying with 
applicable prescriptive requirements, performs. Thereby it is possible to determine how 
deviations to regulations affect safety.  
If effects on safety from deviations can be managed within the scope of each regulation 
separately this is recommendable, since it simplifies the evaluation process. However, if the 
scope of deviations is great, the ship may not achieve the functional requirements as well as a 
prescriptive design. It may then be necessary to account for performing better in other areas to 
compensate for such deficiencies.  
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3.2.1 Overview of the investigation of affected regulations (SOLAS Consolidated Edition 2009) 
 
A scrutiny of the fire safety regulations in SOLAS II-2 was carried out where the regulations 
were divided below and where deficiencies of the base design were determined. Identified 
deviations to prescriptive requirements are summarized in table 3.4 along with associated 
regulation functional requirements and regulation objectives. The deviations to regulations are 
thereafter described in the following paragraphs. 
Table 3.4. SOLAS II-2 Fire safety (Evegren 2015) 
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3.2.2 Fire protection and safety objectives (SOLAS Consolidated Edition 2009) 
 
Fire safety provisions, for all ships and specific measures for passenger ships, cargo ships and 
tankers are the main key points of this SOLAS’ subchapter. It applies on ships on or after July of 
2002 unless expressed otherwise. The Administrator shall ensure that Chapter’s II-2 provisions 
comply with these regulations. There are restrictions  based on vessel’s type, properties of the 
carrying cargo, deadweight use of oil fuel etc. The restrictions differ if anyone refers to tankers or 
cargo vessels, if the carrying cargo is liquid with a flashpoint exceeding 60
o
C or not. All these 
restrictions are here to ensure the safety of the vessel, to prevent the occurrence of fire and 
explosion and of course to reduce the risk to life caused by fire.  
In a second stage their aim is to reduce the risk of damage to the ship, its cargo and the 
environment and contain, control and suppress fire and explosion in the compartment of origin. 
Of course it is imperative to provide adequate and readily accessible means of escape for 
passengers and crew. 
In order for the above objectives to be achieved, the following requirements are as 
appropriate: 
1. division of the ship into main vertical and horizontal zones by thermal and 
structural boundaries 
2. separation of accommodation spaces from the remainder of the ship by thermal 
and structural boundaries 
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3. restricted use of combustible materials 
4. detection of any fire in the zone of origin 
5. containment and extinction of any fire in the space of origin 
6. protection of means of escape and access for fire-fighting 
7. ready availability of fire-extinguishing appliances 
8. minimization of possibility of ignition of flammable cargo vapour 
The probability of ignition must be prevented through means to control leaks of flammable 
liquids and control the accumulation of vapours. In addition, all ignition sources, including 
combustible materials are needed to be restricted. 
A possible ignition point might be the oil fuel. Its flashpoint shall be more than 60
o
C and in 
emergency generators more than 43
o
C. The fuel oil tanks, except those arranged in double bottom 
compartments, shall be located outside of machinery spaces of category A. 
The location of fuel oil systems must be illuminated adequately and the ventilation under 
normal conditions, so to prevent accumulation of vapour. The oil fuel pipes shall be fitted with 
cock or valve directly on the tank so to ensure being closed in case of a fire. Also they shall not 
terminate in any space with high risk of spillage of surrounding pipe might arise, especially in 
passenger or crew spaces. Material shall be steel or other approved material and must be designed 
in maximum peak pressure, which is occurred through service. 
The probability of ignition is also considered to appear in cargo areas of tankers. Therefore 
cargo pump-rooms, cargo tanks, slop tanks and cofferdams shall be positioned forward of 
machinery spaces. However, oil fuel bunker tanks need not be forward of machinery spaces. 
Cargo tanks and slop tanks shall be isolated from machinery spaces by cofferdams, cargo pump-
rooms, oil bunker tanks or ballast tanks. Main cargo control stations, control stations, 
accommodation and service spaces (excluding isolated cargo handling gear lockers) shall be 
positioned aft of cargo tanks, slop tanks, and spaces which isolate cargo or slop tanks from 
machinery spaces, but not necessarily aft of the oil fuel bunker tanks and ballast tanks, and shall 
be arranged in such a way that a single failure of a deck or bulkhead shall not permit the entry of 
gas or fumes from the cargo tanks into an accommodation space, main cargo control stations, 
control station, or service spaces. Machinery spaces, may be permitted forward of the cargo tanks 
and slop tanks provided they are isolated from the cargo tanks and slop tanks by cofferdams, 
cargo pump-rooms, oil fuel bunker tanks or ballast tanks, and have at least one portable fire 
extinguisher. In cases where they contain internal combustion machinery, one approved foam-
type extinguisher of at least 45 l capacity or equivalent shall be arranged in addition to portable 
fire extinguishers. Accommodation spaces, main cargo control spaces, control stations and 
service spaces shall be arranged in such a way that a single failure of a deck or bulkhead shall not 
permit the entry of gas or fumes from the cargo tanks into such spaces.  
For tankers of 20,000 tons deadweight and upwards, the protection of the cargo tanks shall be 
achieved by a fixed inert gas system. 
40 
 
Once a fire occurs on vessels, then the expansion must be limited through SOLAS rules. This 
can be achieved by setting means of control for the air supply to the space, for the flammable 
liquids and the restriction of the use of combustible materials. Inlets and outlets of the ventilation 
systems must be designed to close from outside the ventilating spaces. In passenger ships for 
more than 36 passengers, all fans of the power ventilation shall be stopped from both of two 
separate positions. In regards to the insulating materials must be non-combustible. Ceilings, all 
linings, grounds, draught rooms shall be of non-combustible materials.  
 The use of non-combustible materials prevent the generation of smoke and toxicity that 
they create when set on fire. In case of fire, the quantity of smoke and toxic product, released 
from the combustible materials, must be limited. Therefore, paints, vanishes and other substances 
must be in accordance with the Fire Test Procedure Code. On passenger ships constructed on or 
after 1 July 2008, paints, varnishes and other finishes, used on exposed surfaces of cabin 
balconies, shall not be capable of producing excessive quantities of smoke and toxic products. 
Primary deck coverings, if applied within accommodation and service spaces and control 
stations, shall be of approved material which will not give rise to smoke or toxic or explosive 
hazards at elevated temperatures. 
 In case of fire, systems of detection in the space of origin, systems for alarm for safe escape 
and fire-fighting activity are more than imperative. These requirements shall be met with fixed 
fire detection and fire alarm system installations, which are suitable for the nature of the space, 
fire growth potential and potential generation of smoke and gases. Manually operated call points, 
fire patrols shall provide an effective means of detecting and locating fires and alerting the 
navigation bridge and fire teams. Also very important role shall play the fixed fire detection and 
fire alarm. They must be so designed and the detectors so positioned, as to detect rapidly the 
onset of fire. The detection system shall initiate audible and visual alarms distinct in both respects 
from the alarms of any other system not indicating fire, in sufficient places to ensure that the 
alarms are heard and observed on the navigating bridge and by a responsible engineer officer.  
Same protection measures are required in any case independently if the vessel is a cargo or a 
passenger vessel. Of course, if the vessel carries passengers, then the rules are slightly stricter. 
Fire patrols shall well trained to be familiar with the arrangements of the ship as well as the 
location and operation of any equipment he may be called upon to use. 
Furthermore, in passenger ships either at sea or in a port, the fire alarm signaling systems shall 
be so manned or equipped as to ensure that any initial fire alarm is immediately received by a 
responsible member of the crew. 
 Another discrepancy in passenger vessels in contrast to the cargo ones is that they are 
subdivided by thermal and structural boundaries. Structural integrity regulation intends to ensure 
structural integrity is maintained in case of fire. The hull, superstructures, structural bulkheads, 
decks and deckhouses shall be constructed of steel or other equivalent material.  
Structures shall thus be constructed in steel or other equivalent material, i.e. any non-
combustible material which, by itself or due to insulation provided, has structural and integrity 
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properties equivalent to steel at the end of the standard fire test (MSC.45 (65)). This prescriptive 
requirement cannot be complied with, as FRP composite per definition is not a non-combustible 
material. The structural and integrity properties equivalent to steel may be achieved at the end of 
the applicable exposure to the standard fire test since the FRP composite is sufficiently insulated. 
However, unlike the requirements on structural and integrity properties, the requirement for non-
combustibility is not time-limited. It may be argued that steel per definition also loses structural 
integrity after 60 minutes; not due to strength deterioration by heat but due to heat transfer and 
thereby fire spread to adjacent compartments. Yet, the fact that FRP composite constructions are 
combustible may not be overlooked. A prolonged fire could involve and deteriorate a FRP 
composite structure when the thermal insulation is no longer enough to keep the temperatures 
sufficiently low. A worst-case scenario fire could bring about a local collapse when the FRP 
laminates detach from the core. In this context it is also worth remembering that also steel 
constructions suffer from strength deterioration and particularly deformation problems when 
heated enough. Generally steel loses its structural strength at about 400-600°C and a sandwich 
FRP composite laminate may lose its bonding between core and laminate, and thereby structural 
performance, when heated to about 150°C. Still, steel ships have proved to be able to survive fire 
for several days without progressive structural collapse occurring 
The hull, superstructure and deckhouses shall be subdivided into main vertical zones by "A-
60" class divisions. Steps and recesses shall be kept to a minimum, but where they are necessary 
they shall also be "A-60" class divisions. Where a category (5), (9) or (10) space is on one side or 
where fuel oil tanks are on both sides of the division the standard may be reduced to "A -0". 
Bulkheads within a main vertical zone, which are not required to be "A" class divisions, shall be 
at least "B" class or "C" class divisions.  
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Table 3.5. Bulkheads not bounding either main vertical zones or horizontal zones (SOLAS 
Consolidated Edition 2009) 
 
 
Table 3.6. Decks not forming steps in main vertical zones nor bounding horizontal zones 
(SOLAS Consolidated Edition 2009) 
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Tables 3.5 and 3.6 shall apply respectively to the bulkheads and decks separating adjacent 
spaces. For determining the appropriate fire integrity standards to be applied to divisions between 
adjacent spaces, such spaces are classified according to their fire risk as shown in categories (1) 
to (11) below. Where the contents and use of a space are such that there is a doubt as to its 
classification for the purpose of this regulation, or where it is possible to assign two or more 
classifications to a space, it shall be treated as a space within the relevant category having the 
most stringent boundary requirements. Smaller, enclosed rooms within a space that have less than 
30 % communicating openings to that space are considered separate spaces. The fire integrity of 
the boundary bulkheads and decks of such smaller rooms shall be as prescribed in tables 3.7 and 
3.8. The title of each category is intended to be typical rather than restrictive.  
 
Table 3.7. Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces in ships carrying no more than 
36 passengers (SOLAS Consolidated Edition 
2009)
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Table 3.8. Fire integrity of decks separating adjacent spaces in ships carrying not more than 36 
passengers (SOLAS Consolidated Edition 2009) 
 
 Tables 3.9 and 3.10 below shall apply respectively to the bulkheads within accommodation 
area and decks separating adjacent spaces. For determining the appropriate fire integrity 
standards to be applied to divisions between adjacent spaces, such spaces are classified according 
to their fire risk as shown in categories (1) to (11) below. Where the contents and use of a space 
are such that there is a doubt as to its classification for the purpose of this regulation, or where it 
is possible to assign two or more classifications to a space, it shall be treated as a space within the 
relevant category having the most stringent boundary requirements. Smaller, enclosed rooms 
within a space that have less than 30% communicating openings to that space are considered 
separate spaces. The fire integrity of the boundary bulkheads and decks of such smaller rooms 
shall be as prescribed in tables 3.9 and 3.10. The title of each category is intended to be typical 
rather than restrictive. 
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Table 3.9. Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces in cargo ships except tankers 
(SOLAS Consolidated Edition 2009) 
 
 
Table 3.10. Fire integrity of decks separating adjacent spaces in cargo ships except tankers 
(SOLAS Consolidated Edition 2009) 
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For the category of the tankers, the following requirements shall govern application of the 
following tables. The mentioned tables shall apply respectively to the bulkhead and decks 
separating adjacent spaces as well. For determining the appropriate fire integrity standards to be 
applied to divisions between adjacent spaces, such spaces are classified according to their fire 
risk as shown in categories (1) to (10) below. Where the contents and use of a space are such that 
there is a doubt as to its classification for the purpose of this regulation, or where it is possible to 
assign two or more classifications to a space, it shall be treated as a space within the relevant 
category having the most stringent boundary requirements. Smaller, enclosed areas within a 
space that have less than 30% communicating openings to that space are considered separate 
areas. The fire integrity of the boundary bulkheads and decks of such smaller spaces shall be as 
prescribed in tables and 3.11 and 3.12. 
 
Table 3.11. Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces in tankers (SOLAS 
Consolidated Edition 2009) 
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Table 3.12. Fire integrity of decks separating adjacent spaces in tankers (SOLAS Consolidated 
Edition 2009) 
 
 
In continuation to SOLAS rules fire fighting chapter presents requirements on the active 
extinguishing systems and other fire extinguishing equipment. The fire extinguishing systems and 
equipment on a ship with constructions in FRP composite will not be affected directly. However, 
the first functional requirement states that the fixed fire extinguishing systems shall have due 
regard to the growth potential of the space. If the fire growth potential differs this may need  to be 
taken into account when designing the fire extinguishing systems. In internal spaces the fire 
growth potential will although not be affected since the FRP composite is thermally protected. It 
may, however, be necessary to consider fire extinguishing systems and equipment in additional 
places of the ship. Exterior surfaces are made of unprotected FRP composite and it could be 
useful to fix an additional sprinkler above doors, so that an enclosure fire will not spread to the 
exteriors if the door is left open. Additional sprinklers may also be useful above windows facing 
the outside to prevent fire to spread through an open or broken window to other decks via the 
exteriors vertical FRP composite surfaces. It may also be relevant to install drencher systems 
covering hazardous parts of the hull, if made in FRP composite, where there is a significant risk 
of fire spread. Additional equipment for manual fire-fighting should also be considered, e.g. on 
open deck spaces surrounded by unprotected FRP composite surfaces. Hence, fire extinguishing 
systems and appliances should be readily available regardless of the construction material of the 
ship. Regarding prescriptive requirements, Regulation 10.2.1.1 requires to use materials in piping 
which are not readily rendered ineffective by heat, unless adequately protected. It could be 
relevant to make piping in FRP but if using sufficient insulation this seems acceptable.  
Even though this regulation only covers fire extinguishing systems and appliances, it may be 
necessary to consider effects on the fire-fighting routines. There are several factors that speak for 
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an improved fire-fighting effectiveness on board a ship with FRP composite constructions when 
comparing to a prescriptive steel ship. First and foremost, removing the need to perform 
defensive boundary cooling will free fire-fighting resources that can be rerouted to either assist in 
actively combating the fire or adopting a defensive or offensive strategy involving cooling of hot 
gases from an adjacent compartment. Boundary cooling is a strategy that requires resources 
without actually fighting the fire but mainly hinders fire spread. A much more efficient way to 
fight an enclosure fire is to quickly get water in to the fire origin, which may although not be 
possible due to the heat or risk of fire spread if a door is opened. Combining the relieved fire-
fighting resources on a ship with FRP composite with tools such as Fog Spear or Cutting 
Extinguisher will allow dampening the fire from outside of the fire origin. Furthermore, it is even 
more important to quickly extinguish a fire in a FRP composite construction since several fire 
tests have shown that a fire that has been quite severe for some time and has taken root in the 
FRP composite will be more difficult to fully extinguish than a prescriptive design. This implies 
more resources may be needed for keeping watch over fire scorched areas to ensure flames do not 
reignite. However, this will likely not significantly interfere with the critical stages of taking 
control of the fire. Another aspect of how fire-fighting routines could be affected is that the 
improved thermal resistance of FRP composite structures could imply difficulties in finding the 
seat of the fire from adjacent compartments with a commonly used thermal imaging camera. All 
in all the ability to focus more resources on actively fighting the fire, combined with the 
introduction of tools to cool hot fire gases from an adjacent compartment are expected to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of fire-fighting efforts in ships with FRP composite 
constructions. In any case, effects on fire-fighting routines need to be taken into consideration 
when making ship constructions in FRP composite.  
In regards to the regulation of means of escape, its aim is to provide means for persons to 
safely and swiftly escape a fire, assemble and proceed to their evacuation station (embarkation 
deck). Looking at the prescriptive requirements, Regulation 13.3.1.3 requires all stairways in 
accommodation spaces, service spaces and control stations to be of steel frame construction or 
other equivalent material sanctioned by the Administration. Such constructions are although not 
considered in other materials than steel, which is generally the case also on ships in FRP 
composite.  
In order to achieve safe escape routes Regulation 13 requires fire integrity and insulation in 
several places, referring to values in Regulation 9 (tables 9.1 to 9.4). It may be argued that steel is 
therefore implicitly required. However, since it is only referred to fire integrity and insulation 
values and not to the class of the divisions, a sufficiently insulated FRP composite division could 
be claimed to achieve these requirements.  
Furthermore, from the discussions above on critical temperature for softening of the FRP 
laminate-core interface, it is clear that the provided insulation must keep the temperature at the 
interface on the side exposed to fire below ~130°C to achieve sufficient structural integrity in 
case of fire. The temperature on the unexposed side will, down to the high insulation capacity of 
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the composite construction, therefore be virtually at room temperature even after 60 minutes of 
fire. The heat from a fire will therefore to a larger extent stay in the fire enclosure and not easily 
be transmitted to adjacent spaces. Down to the improved thermal insulation, the decks, bulkheads 
and ambience in adjacent spaces will be of ambient temperature, which could be advantageous in 
an escape situation and could increase the probability of a successful escape. In addition, more 
crew could help with the evacuation since there is no need for boundary cooling and the time 
available for escape and evacuation could thereby be increased.  
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3.3. Requirements for FRP use on vessels based on major class societies’ Rules  
 
3.3.1. Differences in Fire Safety between Naval and Commercial Vessels (McGeorge 2002) 
 
There are major differences between naval and commercial crafts that have significant impact 
on fire safety strategy: 
a) Crew and passengers  
b) Mission and criteria for evacuation  
c) Threats and fire scenarios  
A commercial passenger vessel has a large number of passengers and a limited crew, with 
limited training and equipment for firefighting. Due to the limited capability for the crew and 
passengers to carry out active firefighting, the automatic systems should be capable of detecting 
and extinguish a fire in “major” and “moderate fire hazard areas”. If this fails, the passive fire 
protection should ensure enough time for safe evacuation. In areas without automatic 
extinguishing systems, i.e. in areas of “minor fire hazard” like the accommodation/passenger 
decks, a local fire shall be prevented from developing assuming very simple firefighting, e.g. 
with hand held equipment. For this reason, the requirements to a “fire restricting material” in the 
IMO HSC-code are very strict. 
The mission for a passenger/cargo vessel is obviously to carry passengers/cargo from A to B. 
However, in case of a fire passenger and crew safety is of priority one. In case of a fire that is not 
extinguished by the automatic systems or by the limited crew, evacuation is the only alternative.  
For a commercial vessel, most fires starts in areas of “Major” and “Moderate” fire hazard 
areas. This is e.g. main engine rooms, auxiliary engine rooms, electrical switchboards, galleys, 
etc. These areas are protected accordingly, usually covered by both active and passive measures. 
The goal is to keep a fire within the defined cell, and preferably extinguish it without evacuation. 
Fires outside these areas are less probable, usually small, and are taken care of by requirements to 
fire reaction, i.e. restricted use of combustible materials.  
On a naval vessel all crewmembers are trained for fire situations, and special team(s) are 
equipped and trained for firefighting. Hence, active firefighting can be relied on to an appreciable 
extent. Today’s naval vessels have usually considerably less fire insulation than an IMO vessel 
(SOLAS or HSC-code). It is of course important that time is available to activate manual or 
automatic systems and/or the firefighting teams before a developing fire become too large (e.g. 
flashover in a number of compartments). The time available is of course dependent on the fire 
scenarios and design threats.   
For a naval vessel, the safety of the crew is of course also important, but to carry out the 
mission and rescue the ship with its special “cargo” has higher priority, at least in a combat 
situation. Evacuation is the last option, and much effort will be put in active firefighting even 
after the “lifetime” of the fire resisting divisions is exceeded. An example is the fight to rescue 
the US Navy frigate “USS Stark” that was hit by two missiles during the Gulf War. The fire that 
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followed the residual missile propellant burning was extinguished after 36 hours, with a 
considerable loss of lives.  
In peace time the fire hazards for a naval vessel is similar to those of commercial vessels, 
except in special areas like magazines, aviation fuel stores and at locations of weapon systems 
which require special attention also in peace time.  
For naval vessels in combat situations, the number of possible fire scenarios increase 
dramatically. The possibility of a fire is large. More than 80% of loss of ships in modern conflicts 
is due to fire. It is impossible to decide where an enemy induced fire will start. Fire can start due 
to a missile hit, a terrorist attack, etc. The whole ship is therefore a possible area of “Major fire 
hazard”, if the IMO terms is used, and instead of protecting the whole vessel, it is often divided 
into so called NBCD-zones (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Damage control zones) that are fire 
and blast resistant. Larger ships shall be capable of operating up to a certain level even if one of 
the zones is damaged by e.g. fire or blast, or both, and the fire should be kept within the zone. 
The zones are usually vertical, but more and more navies are now specifying also the decks as 
fire divisions.  
There is a large range of naval vessels, with a corresponding large range of mission and 
capability to withstand a certain threat. It does not make sense and it is not realistic to protect a 
small vessel like a fast patrol boat, minesweeper/minehunter or corvette to the same threat levels 
as a destroyer or aircraft carrier. This is true for most types of wartime threats like e.g. internal 
and external blast resistance etc. Due to the large variation in mission and design threat levels, it 
is very difficult to establish a “code” such as the SOLAS or the HSC-code for military vessels. 
As mentioned in previous sections a fire safety case should be established for each vessel.   
However, it could be possible to develop some general requirements:  
i. For fire reaction, the HSC-code requirements for composite structures have proven to be 
very strict, also compared to requirements to surface materials on steel ships. This can be used as 
a general requirement for the interior for all vessels. This is an approach many navies seem to 
prefer, as this provides some equivalency to the commercial vessels, and test methods and 
acceptance criteria are already developed and internationally accepted. For selection of method 
for fire passive fire protection, it is very important to decide if the vessel is expected to survive a 
hit by an exploding missile, shell or projectile. If the answer is “yes”, there are (at least) two 
alternative methods for passive fire protection to fulfill fire reaction requirements:  
ii. Normal structural composite with an added protection that survives the blast that can 
precede a fire. If the added fire protection does not survive, the readily combustible structural 
composite will be exposed and contribute to the fire and make firefighting more difficult, not 
only because of fire growth rate, but also due to smoke development. Design blast level is 
dependent  on ship size. 
iii. Composite structure with inherently good fire reaction behavior. This structure does not 
need much added protection, and if destroyed in e.g. a blast, there will be limited contribution to 
smoke production and heat release.  
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The same main methods can be used to fulfill fire resistance requirements, but of course 
different scantlings and/or protection systems are needed to cope with a fully developed fire. 
There are several maritime societies that classify vessels such as: 
1. International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
2. American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) 
3. Bureau Veritas 
4. Det Norske Veritas (DNV) 
5. Lloyd's Register of Shipping 
6. Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 
7. Register Italiano Navale 
The U.S. Navy in conjunction with ABS creates the rules for the combatant high-speed craft 
called Naval Vessel Rules (NVR). The IMO is the United Nations' specialized agency 
responsible for regulating all matters pertaining to shipping.  
The U.S. Coast Guard is statutorily charged with administering maritime safety on behalf of 
the people of the United States. In carrying out this function, the Coast Guard monitors safety 
aspects of commercial vessels from design stages throughout the vessel’s useful life. Often 
design standards such as those developed by the American Bureau of Shipping are used. Codes 
are referenced directly by the U.S: Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) [7-1]. Other countries, 
such as England, France, Germany, Norway, Italy and Japan have their own standards that are 
analogous to those developed by ABS. Treatment of FRP materials is handled differently by each 
country.  
 
3.3.2. U.S. Coast Guard Rules 
 
The Coast Guard operates on both a local and national level to accomplish their mission. On 
the local level, 42 Marine Safety Offices (MSOS) are located throughout the country. These 
offices are responsible for inspecting vessels during construction, inspecting existing vessels, 
licensing personnel and investigating accidents. The Office of Marine Safety, Security and 
Environment Protection is located in Washington, DC. This Office of Marine Safety policy, 
directs marine safety training, oversees port security and responds to the environmental need of 
the country. The Marine Safety Center, also located in Washington, is the office where vessel 
plans are reviewed. The Coast Guard’s technical staff reviews machinery, electrical arrangement, 
structural and stability plans, calculations and instructions for new construction and conversions 
for approximately 18,000 vessels a year. 
The Coast Guard has authorized ABS for plan review of certain types of vessels. These do not 
include Subchapter T vessels and novel craft. The following section will attempt to describe the 
various classifications of vessels, as defined in the CFR. Table  3.13 summarizes some of these 
designations. Structural requirements for each class of vessel will also be highlighted. 
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Table 3.13. Summary of CFR Vessel Classifications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2.1. Uninspected Vessels 
 
The CFR regulations that cover uninspected vessels are primarily concerned with safety, 
rather than structural items. The areas covered include: 
 Life preservers and other lifesaving equipment 
 Emergency position indicating radio beacons (fishing vessels) 
 Fire extinguishing equipment 
 Backfire flame control 
 Ventilation 
 Cooking, heating and lighting systems 
 Garbage retention. 
 
3.3.2.2. Passenger Vessels 
 
In general, compliance with the standards established by ABS will be considered satisfactory 
evidence of structural efficiency of the vessel. However, in special cases, a detailed analysis of 
the entire structure or some integral part may be made by the Coast Guard to determine the 
structural requirements. 
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The hull, structural bulkheads, decks, and deckhouses shall be constructed of steel or other 
equivalent metal construction of appropriate scantlings. 
 
3.3.2.3. Cargo and Miscellaneous Vessels 
 
The hull, superstructure, structural bulkheads, decks and deckhouses shall be constructed of 
steel. Alternately, the Commandant may permit the use of other suitable materials in special 
cases, having in mind the risk of fire. 
 
3.3.2.4. Small Passenger Vessels 
 
In general, compliance with the standards established by a recognized classification society 
(Lloyds’ “Rules for the Construction and Classification of Composite and Steel Yachts” and 
Lloyds’ “Rules for the Construction and Classification of Wood Yachts” are acceptable for this 
purpose.) will be considered satisfactory evidence of the structural adequacy of a vessel. When 
scantlings differ from such standards and it can be demonstrated that craft approximating the 
same size, power and displacement have been built to such scantlings and have been in 
satisfactory service insofar as structural adequacy is concerned for a period of at least 5 years, 
such scantlings may be approved A detailed structural analysis may be required for specialized 
types or integral parts thereof.  
The U.S. Coast Guard is charged with inspecting commercial vessels to ensure that structure, 
stability, fire protection and equipment are safe. National standards are contained within the Code 
of Federal Regulations and international regulations are prescribed by the International Maritime 
Organization. Recent initiatives have focused on bringing domestic regulations in line with 
international standards.  
The commercial designer is primarily concerned with the following general restrictions, as 
shows table 3.13 and excerpts from the Code of Federal Regulations:  
 Subchapter T - Small Passenger Vessels: Use of low flame spread (ASTM E 84<100) 
resins 
 Subchapter K - Small Passenger Vessels carrying more than 150 passengers or with 
overnight accommodations for 50 - 150 people: must meet SOLAS requirement with hull 
structure of steel or aluminum conforming to ABS or Lloyd’s 
 Subchapter I - Cargo Vessels: Use of incombustible materials - construction is to be of steel 
or other equivalent material and 
 Subchapter H - Passenger Vessels: SOLAS requires non-combustible structural materials 
and insulated with approved noncombustible materials so that the average back face temperature 
will not rise above designated values. 
Some “K vessels” may be high speed ferries that can alternatively comply with the 
international High Speed Craft (HSC) Code, which does make provision for composite 
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construction. The HSC Code classifies structure with the confusing terminology “firerestricting” 
or “fire-resistive.” “Fire-restricting” applies to all hull, superstructure, structural bulkheads, 
decks, deckhouses and pillars. Flame spread and combustibility are areas of concern for these 
structures. Areas of major and moderate fire hazard must have “fire-resistive” boundaries that 
comply with a SOLAS-type furnace test with loads. These decks and bulkheads must exhibit 
burn through resistance and maintain structural integrity during fires 
The U.S Navy currently does not have a definitive standard that covers the fire performance of 
composite materials on surface combatants. The general policy is to provide an equal level of 
safety to steel construction. Small boats and the specialized minehunter class are exceptions to 
this. Although some prototype composite structures have been deployed in the fleet, the use of 
composite structure or components in manned spaces has been limited. The military spends an 
inordinate amount of time maintaining and replacing corroded metallic structure and would love 
to increase the use of composites to reduce life-cycle costs and manning requirements. 
Additionally, increased stealth and mission requirements for the 21st century surface 
combatant will require the use of composite materials, especially for deckhouse structure. 
 
3.3.3. American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) 
 
The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) is a non-profit organization that develops rules for 
the classification of ship structures and equipment. Although ABS is primarily associated with 
large, steel ships, their involvement with small craft dates back to the 1920’s, when a set of rules 
for wood sailing ship construction was published. The publications and services offered by ABS 
are detailed below.  
 
3.3.3.1. Guide for Building and Classing Offshore Racing Yachts 
 
These guides were developed by ABS, at the request of the Offshore-Racing Council (ORC), 
out of their concern for ever lighter advanced composite boats and lack of suitable standards. At 
that time, several boats and lives had been lost. ABS staff referred the design and construction 
practice for offshore racing yachts, reflected in designer’ and builders’ practice and to limited full 
scale measured load data and refined the results by analysis of many existing proven boats, and 
analysis of damaged boat structures.  
As the Guide was to provide for all possible hull materials, including advanced composites, it 
was essential that it be given in a direct engineering format of design loads and design stresses, 
based on ply, laminate and core material mechanical properties. Such a format permits the 
designer to readily see the influence of design loads, material mechanical properties and 
structural arrangement on the requirements, thereby giving as much freedom as possible to 
achieve optimum use of materials. 
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The Guide gives hull structural design and construction standards for offshore racing yachts 
and for cruising yachts. Boats that are to receive the ABS classification Al Yachting Service are 
required to have engineering systems such as bilge system fuel oil system, electrical system, fire 
protection in accordance with the ABYC recommendations. For sailing yachts over 100 feet in 
length the Guide and the ABYC standards am augmented by parts of the Rules for Building and 
Classing Reinforced Plastic vessels. 
All Rules and Guides  in a continuous state of development to reflect experience, advances in 
technology, new material, changes in building procedures and occasionally to curtail exploitation 
of loopholes. This is nowhere mm true than in the use of advanced composites for offshore racing 
yachts - already the development of additional in-house guidance to augment the Guide, suggests 
a third edition in the near future. It should be noted that the Coast Guard does not yet recognize 
the Guide as an acceptable standard for a vessel to meet the requirements of Subchapter T. 
 
3.3.4. Regulations at European level (Amen and Evergreen 2012) 
 
The latest European directive is 2010/36/EC (also called 2002/25/EC as amended in the 
following chapters) and regulations connected to fire safety are described in chapter II-2, fire 
protection, fire detection and fire extinction in this directive. The fire safety chapter in the EU 
2010/36/EC regulation is divided into chapter A Basic principles and chapter B Fire safety 
measures. The first part of chapter A describes the fire safety objectives which are exactly the 
same as those found in Regulation 2 in SOLAS chapter II-2. The fire safety objectives are 
followed by functional requirements which also are the same as those found in SOLAS chapter 
II-2.  
The fire safety objectives and the functional requirements set out in the European directive can 
be achieved if:  
1. The ship’s design and arrangements, as a whole, comply with the relevant prescriptive 
requirements in this chapter  
2. The ship’s design and arrangements, as a whole, have been reviewed and approved in 
accordance with part F of the revised chapter II-2 in SOLAS 1974, which applies to ships 
constructed on or after 1 January 2003 or  
3. Parts of the ship’s design and arrangements have been reviewed and approved in 
accordance with the above mentioned part F of the revised SOLAS chapter II-2 and the 
remaining parts of the ship comply with relevant prescriptive requirements of the fire safety 
chapter in EU directive 2010/36/EU.  
The European directive is continuously updated based on the SOLAS regulations. The fire 
safety regulations in SOLAS are therefore very similar to the ones in the EU directive, even if the 
SOLAS code has become better structured. It has therefore been judged more appropriate to base 
the analysis in the project on SOLAS. This way of carrying out an analysis is also in line with the 
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EU directive. A more detailed description of the European fire safety regulations and a 
comparison of how these deviate from SOLAS are found in appendix A.  
Both Det Norske Veritas and Lloyd’s Register rules comply with this EU directive. Both allow 
for alternative fire safety design and arrangements, which requires a safety assessment in line 
with Regulation 17 of SOLAS regulations.  
 
 
3.3.5. Swedish Regulations (Amen and Evergreen 2012) 
  
Two documents from the Swedish Transport Agency describe safety for passenger ships: 
SJÖFS 1970:A13 and SJÖFS 2002:17. Amendments to SJÖFS 2002:17 are given in TSFS 
2011:47. Requirements applicable to national passenger ships are described in “Sjöfartsverkets 
meddelanden”. According to this, ships can be built in other non-combustible materials than steel 
if the material has sufficient thermal isolation. Furthermore, spread of the flame shall be limited 
and production of toxic gases during combustion shall be restricted. The European fire safety 
regulations in 2010/36/EC are in general implemented in Swedish law through SJÖFS 2002:17. 
According to the fire safety chapter in this regulation, an analysis according to Regulation 17 
(SOLAS chapter II-2 Regulation 17) can be performed for ships built after 1 January 2003. The 
overall fire safety objectives are exactly the same in SJÖFS 2002:17 as in SOLAS II-2 and the 
overall functional requirements are also the same except for one. The functional requirement to 
divide the ship into main horizontal zones is not mentioned amongst the overall functional 
requirements in SJÖFS 2002:17.  
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3.3.5.1. The VISBY class  
 
The design of Visby class is completely based on the use of composite materials. (Hellbratt 
1998)  Kockums AB/Karlskronavarvet (KAB) has a long tradition in the building of naval ships 
both in metallic materials such as steel and aluminum, and also in composite materials, preferably 
in FRP-Sandwich. (www.canit.se) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14. Visby Class corvette (www.naval-technology.com) 
 
 The Visby, as shown in figures 3.14, 3.16-3.18, is designed to minimize all signatures - 
optical and infrared signature, above water acoustic and hydro acoustic signature, underwater 
electrical potential and magnetic signature, pressure signature, radar cross section and actively 
emitted signals (Lonno 2000). 
The vessel was designed based on the strength requirements as defined in "Det Norske 
Veritas, High Speed and Light Craft" rules (Lonno 1998). 
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Figure 3.14. The extremely flat, outward-stopping CFRP hull of Visby results in controlled 
and favorable reflection of radar waves (www.kockums.se). 
 
The hull is designed on stealth principles with large flat angled surfaces, as depicted above in 
figure 3.14. The stealth effects are the following: 
1. Decreased detection, compliance homing weapon picture 
2. Increased countermeasures effectiveness 
3. Smaller ECM gear 
4. Less maintenance (sheltered equipment); corrosion protection is simpler 
5. Carbon fiber has radar absorption properties (Lonno 1998). 
 
Table 3.15. Visby main characteristics (Lonno 1998) 
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The vessel, which characteristics are in table 3.15, is built of sandwich-construction carbon 
fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP) (consisting of a polyvinyl chloride-PVC core with carbon 
fiber/vinyl ester laminate). The material provides high strength and rigidity, low weight, good 
shock resistance, low radar signature and low magnetic signature. The material dramatically 
reduces the structural weight (typically 50% of a conventional steel hull) (Lonno and Hellbratt 
1995). 
It provides also, high durability and good shock resistance, all at a feasible cost. This results in 
higher payload carrying capacity, higher speed or longer range. In order to meet special 
properties of Visby, special production methods were developed, such as advanced vacuum 
injection technique (Hellbratt and Vollbo). 
 
 
Figure 3.15. Sweden's YS2000 class corvette, the first known production naval at Kockums' 
shipyard on Karlskrona Island (Valenti 2001). 
 
Compared with traditional materials, the CFRP hull has a very good weight/strength/price 
ratio that does not drive overall cost in comparison with other materials. (www.instmat.co.uk) 
 It also gives a hull that is light, but still has excellent shock resistance properties. The hull 
also insulates heat, is nonmagnetic and the surfaces are very flat due to the production method. 
The advantages of using this material concept are numerous (Makinnen, Hellbratt and Olsson 
1988). 
The major advantages are: 
 High stiffness/weight ratio 
 Flat panels, in order to create a low Radar Cross Section (RCS) 
 Non-magnetic material 
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 Shock damping capacity. The CFRP-sandwich structure has excellent energy absorbing 
capacity 
 Thermal insulation 
 Low maintenance cost. As there is no corrosion on a CFRP-hull compared to a steel hull, 
there is only a small need for maintenance, which reduces the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) for the 
vessel 
 
 
Figure 3.17. Sandwich type composite for Visby class, consisted of vinyl ester resin layers 
surrounding a polyvinyl chloride core containing carbon fibers (Valenti 2001). 
 
The hull is consisted of four main sections, fore, mid, aft and superstructure. Joining 
composite sections is much more complicated than joining steel ones. The method used for Visby 
was developed at Kockums and is based upon the KVASI vacuum-infusion method. The total 
cost estimated at $840 million for six (6) ships (from 1998 to 2007). Based on the Swedish 
composites and experience with GRP advantages are: small maintenance cost, no degradation due 
to aging and fatigue, damage is very limited in collisions and groundings and damage is easily 
repaired. (www.janes.com)  
The use of carbon fiber is driven by low weight, RCS reduction, magnetic, IR, and EMI 
shielding requirements. The carbon fiber became a clear solution for high strength & stiffness, 
shock resistance, impact resistance. Carbon fiber gives low overall cost in direct competition 
against aluminum and GRP. There will be also active monitoring of the hull stress to provide the 
crew with the condition of the hull at high speeds in rough conditions (Lyons 2000). 
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Figure 3.18. Bow section of the Visby-class corvette under transportation to the outfitting 
workshop (www.canit.se) 
 
3.3.6. Danish Guidelines on Approval of Risk-Based Ship Design (Amen and Evergreen 2012)  
 
The national safety regulation for relevant passenger ships in Denmark are called 
“Meddelelser fra Søfartsstyrelsen D - Teknisk forskrift om skibes bygning og udstyr m.v. 
Passagerskibe i national fart” and managed by Søfartsstyrelsen, or the Danish Maritime Authority 
in English. As the Swedish regulation, this national regulation fully updated in line with the 
regulations at EU level. Accordingly, the Danish regulation also allows for alternative fire safety 
design and arrangements if, which requires a safety assessment in line with SOLAS chapter II-2 
Regulation 17.  
Furthermore, the Danish Maritime Authority has submitted a guideline on approval of risk-
based ship design to IMO. The guideline (MSC 86/5/3) can be used for instance when an analysis 
according to Regulation 17 is carried out. Regulation 17 refers to the guidelines of alternative 
design and arrangements found in Circular 1002 but the Danish guideline is a good complement 
for the approval process, as it describes the applicable steps in greater detail. 
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3.4. Analysis of Regulation 17 (Development of guidelines for use of FRPs within ship 
structures, 2013) 
 
3.4.1. Introduction 
 
As concluded above, FRP composite structures ships could be treated as alternative fire safety 
design and arrangements in line with regulation II-2/17. Regulation 17 is approved guidelines on 
alternative design and arrangements for fire safety. Marine Safety Committee endorsed 
mentioned guidelines, at its 74
th
 session on 30 May to 8 June 2001. They came into force on 1 
July 2002 and serve to outline the methodology for the engineering analysis required by SOLAS 
regulation II-2/17 on Alternative design and arrangements, applying to a specific fire safety 
system, design or arrangements for which the approval of an alternative design,  deviating from 
the prescriptive requirements of SOLAS chapter II-2 is sought. In regards to the analysis of the 
Reg. 17, it is crucial to specify some of the definitions. 
First of all Alternative Design includes fire safety measures different from the one of SOLAS 
chapter II-2, but capable of satisfying chapter’s fire safety objective(s) and functional 
requirements. It comprises a large range of means, including both alternative and traditional 
shipboard structures. Design fire describes in curves, the heat release rate versus time, the 
development and spread of the fire in a design fire scenario. Design fire scenario is a set of 
conditions of the fire and describes ventilation conditions, ignition sources, arrangement and 
quantity of combustible materials and fire load accounting for the effects of fire detection, fire 
protection, fire control and suppression and fire mitigation measures.  
In addition, Functional Requirements define what action must be provided by the ship in order 
to meet SOLAS. Performance Criteria are values that justify how sufficient the trial designs are. 
The Prescriptive Design is the measures in accordance with the B, C, D, E or G chapter II-2 on 
SOLAS.  
Furthermore to the definitions, really important one is the Safety Margin, which is the 
adaptations, so to counterbalance the processes used to evaluate the alternative design.  
Last, Sensitivity Analysis means the analysis to prescribe the effect of changes in input 
parameters on the results of a given model or calculation method. 
According to regulation II-2/17.3, an engineering analysis shall then be carried out based on a 
method summarized in the regulation, whilst more detailed descriptions of the method are lain 
out in guidelines, MSC/Circ.1002. These guidelines open up for using performance-based 
methods of fire safety engineering to verify that the fire safety of a ship with alternative design 
and arrangements is equivalent to the fire safety stipulated by prescriptive regulations, a concept 
often referred to as the “equivalence principle”. Briefly, the procedure can be described as a two-
step deterministic risk assessment carried out by a design team. The two major parts to be 
performed are:  
1. the preliminary analysis in qualitative terms and  
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2. the quantitative analysis.  
In the first part, the design team is to define the scope of the analysis, identify hazards and 
from these develop design fire scenarios as well as develop trial alternative designs. The different 
components of the preliminary analysis in qualitative terms are documented in a preliminary 
analysis report which needs consent by the design team before it is sent to the Administration for 
review. When the Administration approves alternative design and arrangements for fire safety, 
pertinent technical information about the approval should be summarized on the reporting form 
given in appendix B and should be submitted to the International Maritime Organization for 
circulation to the Member Governments. 
With the Administration’s approval, which documentation should be provided as indicated in 
appendix C the preliminary analysis report documents the inputs to the next step of the 
assessment, the quantitative analysis. Now the design fire scenarios are quantified and, since 
there are no explicit criteria for the required level of fire safety, outcomes are compared between 
the trial alternative designs and a prescriptive design. Accordingly, the prescriptive design can be 
referred to as a reference design, complying with all the relevant prescriptive fire safety 
requirements. The documented level of fire safety of the alternative design and arrangements is 
therefore not absolute but relative to the implicit fire safety of a traditional design, which is 
likewise a product of the fire safety implied by prescriptive regulations. Accounting for 
uncertainties when comparing levels of fire safety, the final documentation of the engineering 
analysis based on regulation II-2/17 (hereafter referred to as “Regulation 17 assessment”) should 
with reasonable confidence demonstrate that the fire safety of the alternative design and 
arrangements is at least equivalent to that of a prescriptive design. 
 
3.4.2. Complications Necessary to Consider when Evaluating FRP Composite Structures through 
Regulation II-2/17 
 
According to regulation II-2/17, alternative design and arrangements for fire safety should 
provide a degree of safety at least equivalent to that achieved by complying with the prescriptive 
requirements. To form an approval basis, it is stated that the Regulation 17 assessment should 
include an identification of the prescriptive requirement(s) with which the alternative design and 
arrangements will not comply (regulation II-2/17.3.2). This is also a foundational part in 
MSC/Circ.1002 where it is stated that the regulations affecting the proposed alternative design 
and arrangements, along with their functional requirements, should be clearly understood and 
documented. The preliminary analysis should include a clear definition of the regulations which 
affect the design and a clear understanding of the objectives and functional requirements of the 
regulations (i.e. the purpose statement in figure 5). The objectives and functional requirements of 
the deviated prescriptive requirements can thereafter be used (along with the fire safety 
objectives) to define performance criteria, as described in paragraphs 4.4 and 6.3.2 in 
MSC/Circ.1002 and in regulation II-2/17.3.2. However, due to limitations in current regulations, 
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an identification of deviated prescriptive requirements and their associated purpose statements 
may not form a sufficient basis to evaluate the safety of FRP composite ship designs. The 
regulations are namely based on assumptions regarding the design and arrangements and all 
safety requirements are therefore not apparent. In particular, many requirements are made up 
around steel designs, leaving many implicit requirements unwritten. Depending on the degree of 
scope of the proposed alternative design and arrangements, additional investigations may 
therefore be called for to consider how the implicit level of fire safety represented in the code is 
affected. This may be relevant for an assessment of any design and arrangements which are truly 
novel (not simple extensions of the corresponding prescriptive requirements) since all hazards 
are not addressed by the convention. A simple comparison with existing prescriptive 
requirements may not be sufficient and the assessment may hence require special attention. 
Investigations of effects on the implicit level of fire safety, or identification of missing 
requirements, could although be claimed necessary regardless of the novelty of the proposed 
alternative design and arrangements. To further complicate the comparison of safety levels, 
many prescriptive requirements namely have unclear connections with the purpose statements of 
their regulations and also with the fire safety objectives of the fire safety chapter, which are 
supposed to define “fire safety”. Some functional requirements could for example be claimed 
missing based on the prescriptive requirements and for some functional requirements listed at the 
beginning of regulations there are no associated prescriptive requirements. Deviation from one 
prescriptive requirement may affect the achievement of a functional requirement of a different 
regulation etc. A regulation 17 assessment involving FRP composite structures, as any regulation 
17 assessment, must be sufficient to describe the introduced novelty in terms of fire safety. 
Determining the approval basis only based on deviated prescriptive requirements may not be 
sufficient but additional investigations of effects on the implicit level of fire safety may be 
necessary. These guidelines attempt to clarify potential explicit and implicit such effects 
subsequently. 
Based on the above paragraphs is the alternative design, which was proposed by the designer, 
Ragnar Hansen of Hansen Engineering. It was examined the possibility of a composite hatch 
cover in commercial ship. Ragnar Hansen described the process, which led to approval, being 
received from Panama Maritime Authority, on 11th December 2014, for retrofit of FRP (fibre 
reinforced plastic) hatch covers to replace traditional steel ones on a bulk carrier. The typical 
cargo of the bulk carrier named Oshima is coil, grain, iron ore and cement. It is a double bottom 
with single skin 75,600 DWT Panamax, with dimensions 220 x 32 x 19 m.  
The alternative design of the mentioned project was consisted of replacing existing hatch 
cover, made from steel, by a single skin GRP (E-glass fibre and polyester resin) with thicknesses 
ranging from 10 to 30 mm. Through the step of the preliminary analysis everything was in 
accordance with the recommendations of the IMO 2008 International Maritime Solid Bulk 
Cargoes or IMSBC Code. The safety objectives or functional requirements were fulfilled for the 
alternative design. For instance the fire safety objectives of SOLAS II-2 .5, “provide adequate 
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and readily accessible means of escape for passengers and crew”, were not influenced by the 
alternative design and hence fulfilled. 
As a next step was the identification of fire hazards and scenarios. The process carried out in a 
HAZID workshop with design team and was systematically identified and recorded the room/pre-
fire situation, ignition source, initial fuel, extension potentials, critical factors, 
statistics/frequencies. In regards to the fire hazards, cement and ore are non-combustible, grain 
(wheat, maize etc.) has different types with different combustibility, selfcombustion, less critical 
than ignition risks associated with coal cargo. Coal is a combustible cargo that can be self-heating 
and self-igniting. Oxidation and combustibility characteristics vary depending on coal type. This 
type of cargo is directly addressed in this analysis.  
The first fire scenario, which selected, was coal fire in the closed cargo hold at sea up to one 
week from harbour for unloading of coal and the second one was deck fire close to hatch cover at 
sea or at berth. These two scenarios were consisted of three stages. One with slow oxidation (up 
to 50°C), the other with intermediate stage of oxidation with increasing rate in temperature 
change (1. Steady-state oxidation with removal of moisture (50-80°C), 2. Evolution of oxides of 
carbons (up to 120°C), 3. Rapid interaction with oxygen (up to 180°C) and 4. Thermal 
decomposition (180-250°C)) and the last one, were took place self-sustained combustion (200-
250°C). 
The results of the preliminary analysis determined that the fire risk for the novel composite 
hatch cover is considered equivalent to that implied by the prescriptive requirements of SOLAS 
and should be substantiated quantitatively in the quantitative assessment.  
In the quantitative assessment the performance criteria that were set, i.e. no loss of life and the 
hatch cover shall be capable of maintaining its structural integrity for a period of one (1) week, 
they met with total success. 
In general the design for the 17m x 8m FRP hatch covers has several benefits. It reduces 
weight (typically 35-40% of steel), resulting in fuel saving and/or increased cargo, as well as 
easier crane handling and lighter motors. No corrosion means better seal performance, reducing 
risk of damage to cargo. 
Approval for conversion has been given for a 225 x 32 m cargo vessel owned by Danish 
shipping company Nordic Bulk Carriers AS. Hansen worked with classification society DNV-GL 
and fire experts at SP Technical Research Institute of Sweden to provide the design and risk 
assessment for the conversion project specification developed by Oshima Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. 
Tommy Hertzberg, chair of E-LASS and a fire researcher at SP, describes this as a breakthrough. 
This is the first time a composite part has been approved using the alternative design approach. 
A current IMO committee is developing guidelines to help national authorities to assess FRP 
designs.  
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3.4.3 General about Engineering Analysis and Risk Assessment  
 
To obtain sufficient fire safety according to SOLAS, the fire safety objectives and functional 
requirements found in regulation 2 need to be achieved; either by fulfilment of the prescriptive 
requirements specified in parts B, C, D, E and G or by demonstrating that an alternative design 
and arrangements is at least as safe as if the ship would have been designed according to 
prescriptive requirements. The latter option is described in regulation II-2/17. Corresponding 
possibilities to use alternative design and arrangements exist also in other parts of SOLAS (e.g. 
for life-saving appliances, machinery and electrical installations) and is a step towards future 
Goal-Based Standards.  
When laying claim to regulation II-2/17, an analysis shall show that sufficient safety is 
achieved by the alternative design and arrangements with regards to potential fire hazards. 
Guidelines for such analysis are found in MSC/Circ.1002. However, when considering FRP 
composite structures it may also be relevant to consider MSC.1/Circ.1455, guidelines which have 
been developed to provide a consistent process for the coordination, review and approval of 
alternative design and arrangements in general, i.e. not only fire safety. This may be particularly 
appropriate when the use of FRP composite affects other aspects of safety than those related to 
fire.  
 
3.4.4. Recommendations Regarding Uncertainty Treatment  
 
Even the most detailed risk assessment contains limitations and uncertainties, which   are 
underlying throughout the whole process. The uncertainties entering when determining the 
frequencies and probabilities of events are often perceived as the dominating sources of error. 
Generally data is insufficient or not fully relevant for the particular events. Common reasons are 
that statistics have simply not been recorded or that the data is aged and does not comprise 
updates in legislation and novel technology. Statistics can give an image of something that has 
happened in the past but evaluations of novel ship designs need to be carried out before the ship 
is put into practice, which implies that statistical data will not available for such parts of the ship. 
The fire risk therefore needs to be calculated from knowledge in the characteristics of the 
alternative design and arrangement and the behaviour in case of fire. A general statistical 
representation may be available for the prescriptive design but this will also be bound with 
(other) uncertainties. Even if statistical information is often considered to be “the truth” it should 
be handled with care since the figures are always changing and may have great errors. 
Attempting to compare a calculated risk of alternative design and arrangements with a statistical 
representation of a prescriptive design, or an absolute risk criterion, may become extremely 
uncertain since the different approaches contribute with fundamentally different uncertainties. It 
could therefore be recommendable to carry out a relative risk assessment, as described in 
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MSC/Circ.1002, even when carrying out a Regulation 17 assessment at a more sophisticated 
level. Thereby uncertainties can be minimized, by founding the risk estimations of the ship 
designs on similar assumptions (e.g. in models, expert judgement, statistical data etc.). In order to 
expose the differences in fire safety it is also recommendable that the assessment concerns only 
the alternative design and arrangements and thereby relevant parts of the ship (a risk measure for 
the ship as a whole may give a wrong representation of the safety).  
When determining consequences of events, uncertainties depend on how systematic and 
detailed the approach is. Models used when estimating the consequences and experience in the 
expert group are also sources of uncertainties. In the hazard identification uncertainties are also 
many times linked with the used method, how detailed it is performed and the competence of the 
expert group examining the systems. Lack of routines, knowledge and experience are drawbacks 
which need to be considered when designing a ship with novel technology. The uncertainties can 
result in missing or wrong scenarios when identifying hazardous events, which can have great 
effects on the proceeding analysis. In common for all steps of the risk assessment is that many 
simplifications are made in order to model complicated systems. Much because of the complex 
matter of assessing the impact of human behaviour when modelling, they tend to be focused on 
machines and technical components. Leaving the effects of organizational aspects, safety 
management systems and operator actions outside the scope of the risk assessment will, however, 
not reduce uncertainties.  
 
3.4.5. Required Method  
 
Many different methods for risk assessment, of varying sophistication, can be used to evaluate 
uncertainties in a ship design, which is the focus when adopting a risk-based approach. All ship 
designs contain uncertainties and all risk assessments contain uncertainties. As a result, all 
decisions will be made under some measure of uncertainty. If a risk assessment would result in 
an absolute certain probability density function of the possible consequences, a decision would be 
truly “risk-based”. However, since uncertainties cannot be eliminated it is important to analyse 
them and to appraise the effects of uncertainties on the result and the total effect when these 
uncertainties are considered. Methods for risk assessment are often classified based on the 
inclusion of quantitative measures (qualitative-quantitative) or on the consideration to likelihood 
of outcomes (deterministic-probabilistic). A more suitable classification includes the previous 
features but depends on how uncertainties are treated with varying thoroughness.  
The guidelines in MSC/Circ.1002 outline a plausible worst-case approach for analysis and 
evaluation which can be described as a deterministic risk assessment. This kind of consequence 
analysis, commonly referred to as “engineering analysis”, is described in several engineering 
guides to performance-based analysis of fire protection in buildings, which have formed the basis 
for the guidelines. MSC/Circ.1002 makes clear that the scope of the analysis depends on the 
extent of deviations from prescriptive requirements and on the extent of the alternative design 
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and arrangements. However, increased uncertainties do not only increase the scope of the 
analysis but also affect the required accuracy and sophistication of the method for verification of 
safety. A more sophisticated approach will further increase the engineering efforts but may be 
necessary if safety margins are to be kept reasonable and risks are to be properly managed when 
for example deviations are many, significant or concern many areas or when the design and 
arrangements are large, complex, novel or outside the scope of prescriptive requirements. Hence, 
the approach outlined in MSC/Circ.1002 may or may not be sufficient to adequately assess fire 
safety. Furthermore, if the case is simple, a less complicated kind of risk assessment should be 
sufficient. Hence, MSC/Circ.1002 “only” presents guidelines; the required sophistication of the 
method used to assess safety depends on whether it is sufficient to describe the current design and 
arrangements in terms of fire safety. The adaptability of the method used to verify fire safety and 
its dependence on the current scope is clearer in MSC.1/Circ.1455 (4.13.2). Since the term 
“engineering analysis” refers to a certain kind of risk assessment, the more general term 
“Regulation 17 assessment” is used hereafter.  
Moving to regulation II-2/17, the stated ultimate requirement for alternative design and 
arrangements is sufficient safety; an alternative design and arrangements shall be at least as safe 
as if prescriptive requirements were complied with (regulation II-2/17.3.4.2). If the scope of the 
deviations posed by the alternative design and arrangements is great it may be relevant to carry 
out an assessment at that high of a level and determine an index of safety for the whole (or 
considered part of the) ship. However, if effects on safety from deviations can be managed within 
the areas of one or a few regulations separately, this will allow for an assessment on a lower level 
(e.g. limited to evaluations of fire growth potential or containment of fire). This is also why it 
was decided to have regulation 17.2.1 read: “provided that the design and arrangements meet the 
fire safety objectives and the functional requirements”, without mentioning whether it is the 
functional requirements in regulation 2 or in any other regulation. A “minor” alternative design 
and arrangements should be possible to analyse and compare to single functional requirements of 
deviated regulations and then it may not be necessary to evaluate the overall fire safety objectives 
and functional requirements. This although requires that risk control measures are found which 
target potential deficiencies in the areas of the individual deviated regulations.  
 
3.4.6. Practical Recommendations  
 
When FRP composite is used, the fundamental difference is that structures will not be non-
combustible, as required. This will although affect fire safety in many ways, some of which are 
not covered in fire safety regulations. An approval basis for equivalent safety may therefore not 
be sufficiently defined based only on deviations from prescriptive requirements, which is more 
clear in MSC.1/Circ.1455 (4.7.1) than in MSC/Circ.1002 (5.1.2). In order to identify all relevant 
differences in fire safety it is required in each design case to perform the necessary investigations 
to determine an approval basis to a sufficient degree.  
70 
 
These guidelines (in this document) aim to describe potential differences in fire safety when 
using FRP composite compared to what is implied by the prescriptive requirements from a wide 
perspective. A sufficient approval basis may be determined by investigations of deviations and 
associated functional requirements and with help of these guidelines. However, it could also be 
the case that further investigations are needed regarding how the proposed design and 
arrangements affect the fire safety implied by prescriptive requirements. Investigations could for 
example be carried out to clarify effects on the fire safety objectives and functional requirements 
of the fire safety chapter, effects on the structure of the fire safety (effects on the source, exposure 
or effect part of the fire protection), effects on properties of the fire protection (e.g. effects on the 
flexibility, sensitivity, complexity, vulnerability, reliability or human intervention) or effects on a 
fire development (effects on a fire in the incipient, growth, fully developed or decay phase). 
There are also many established methods for hazard identification which may be used.  
In order to manage all the identified pros and cons of the alternative design and arrangements 
with regards to fire safety it is suggested that they are managed in a better way that how it is 
described in MSC/Circ.1002 (5.2.1.2-3), e.g. by collection and rating in a risk-based presentation, 
such as a Procon List or Risk Matrix. This will be of significant value when forming fires 
scenarios. In general when novel design and arrangements are managed it is recommendable to 
have a larger focus on the initial stages of the Regulation 17 assessment, particularly on the 
identification, collection, rating and selection of fire hazards.  
Finally it should be stressed that as well as the sophistication of the risk assessment may vary 
depending on the scope of the proposed design and arrangements, so may the practical process of 
the assessment. MSC/Circ.1002 describes an approach where the assessment is reviewed at two 
stages by formal approval of reports. The guidelines in MSC.1/Circ.1455 include the 
Administration more in the process by putting larger focus on monitoring and having review and 
approval of the assessment in several more but smaller stages. Regardless of which guidelines 
that are referred to, it should be underlined that the actual process may include more steps than in 
the guidelines but it may also be significantly simplified. For example, proposing use of FRP 
composite for interior structures, a limited part of the ship or structures which are ubiquitously 
thermally insulated may not require a lengthy, detailed or very time-consuming assessment. Such 
structures may be for example cabin modules, gratings or a deck house in FRP composite. 
However, a wider scope will imply more differences and more intricate effects on fire safety. 
This may be the case when considering large areas (structures in several main vertical zones or 
deck) or the whole ship in FRP composite or when exterior surfaces are included, passive fire 
protection (insulation) is minimized or when optimizing the fire protection of the FRP composite 
structures in different ways. The needs for verification will then be greater and may increase both 
the required sophistication of the assessment as well as the number of steps and the involvement 
of the Administration in the process. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study investigated the regulations needed to be followed in regards to the fire safety 
while using FRP materials on vessels. More specific it is explored, through the analysis of the 
SOLAS’ Regulation 17 the restrictions and the requirements needed, in order these materials to 
be approved as equivalent.  
Emphasis was given to the stages governing alternative design under Regulation 17 and all 
necessary documents and procedures to be followed, until the granting of the acceptance of the 
alternative proposal. For sure it is a really demanding and labored task to carry out for the 
fulfillment of all governing regulations. 
It is a really current state of art the use of FRP materials, on all kind of vessels for reasons, 
such as cost, maintenance reduction and great functionality of mentioned composites.  
In this respect, current thesis might be considered as a handbook in future outreach efforts of 
the SOLAS’ Regulation 17.  Every such use from any colleague, it would be always considered 
as honor recognition for the author. 
Finally, I want to especially thank the professor of the NTUA, Mr. Tsouvalis, for the care and 
the respected instructions for completion, correctness and integrity of this project. 
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APPENDIX A 
Comparison between EU and SOLAS regulations 
 
The comparison between the regulations in the EU directive and the international SOLAS 
regulations for ship fire safety was based on the EU directive, where these regulations were 
sought in SOLAS. The investigation is presented below in two sections, dividing part A and part 
B of the fire safety chapter in the EU directive. All EU and SOLAS regulations refer to EU 
directive 2002/25/EC as amended, chapter II-2 and SOLAS chapter II-2, respectively. 
 
Part A of the EU directive 
 
The first part of the fire safety chapter in the EU directive covers general fire safety 
requirements and was first subject to scrutiny. The comparison between the EU and SOLAS 
regulations is summarized in table A1 below and further discussed subsequently. 
 
Table A1. The regulations in the EU directive 2002/25/EC as amended, chapter II-2, Part A - 
General, and where the same topics are found in SOLAS chapter II-2 
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Regulation 1 Basic principles  
 
This regulation draws up the basic principles for the EU directive and is not applicable for this 
comparison.  
 
Regulation 2 Definitions  
 
Regulation 2 includes definitions of A, B and C bulkheads and decks, and general definitions 
of terms which are used frequently in the following fire safety chapter. The definitions of A, B 
and C divisions are the same as in SOLAS. The definitions given in regulation 3 are defined in 
the same way in the EU directive except in two cases: Ro-ro spaces, which have been renamed 
Ro-ro cargo spaces in the EU directive, and Open ro-ro spaces, which have been renamed Open 
ro-ro cargo spaces in the EU directive.  
 
Regulation 3 Fire pumps, fire mains, hydrants, hoses and nozzles  
 
This regulation contains information about the dimension, capacity and installation of fire 
pumps and other installations used for fire fighting. The requirements are described in separate 
sections for new C and D ships, depending on the length of the ship (length over 24 meter or not). 
The amount of pumps and minimum pressure in fire hydrants in the EU directive is based on the 
number of passengers instead of tonnage as in SOLAS. This regulation is although most likely 
not affected by a change to plastic composite.  
 
Regulation 4 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems  
 
Fixed fire-extinguishing systems shall comply with the Fire Safety Systems Code [13] which 
implies the same requirements on fixed fire-extinguishing systems as in SOLAS. The chapter 
also describes requirements of fixed fire-extinguishing systems, such as fixed gas fire-
extinguishing systems, low and high expansion foam and fixed pressure water systems and how 
these should be maintained.  
 
Regulation 5 Portable fire extinguishers  
 
Portable fire extinguishers shall comply with the Fire Safety Systems Code [13], as required in 
SOLAS regulation 10.3.  
 
 
 
 
76 
 
Regulation 6 Fire-extinguishing arrangements in machinery spaces  
 
This regulation sets the requirements of fire extinguishing appliances in machinery spaces. It 
is not formed exactly as SOLAS regulation 10.5 but will most likely not be affected by the 
change from steel to plastic composite.  
 
Regulation 7 Special arrangements in machinery spaces  
 
This regulation describes requirements on the arrangement of doors, windows, ventilators and 
funnels in machinery spaces. It is based on SOLAS regulation 9.5 and is not affected by the 
change from steel to plastic composite. Regulation 8 Automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire 
alarm systems This regulation describes requirements of the automatic sprinkler system which 
should be according to the Fire Safety Systems Code [13], as required by SOLAS regulation 
10.6. Regulation 9 Fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems This regulation is based on 
regulation 7.2 and 7.7 in SOLAS. Regulation 9.5 in the EU directive is an addition to SOLAS, 
describing requirements of a fixed fire alarm system towards corrosion resistance, independence 
of other systems, electrical power supply to the system etc. Regulation 10 Arrangement for oil 
fuel, lubricating oil and other flammable oils This regulation describes the arrangement and 
requirements of oil fuels and how they should be maintained. This regulation is not affected by 
exchanging the structural material from steel to plastic composite. 
 
Regulation 11 Firefighter’s outfit  
 
This regulation describes the number of fire-fighter‟s outfits that should be available and their 
quality.  
 
Regulation 12 Miscellaneous items  
 
This regulation describes requirements on miscellaneous items, such as waste receptacles, 
electric radiators, heated apparatus for cooking and requirements for penetration of e.g. cables 
and pipes through A or B class divisions. The requirements of the miscellaneous items are given 
in more detail in the EU directive than in the corresponding regulation 4.4 in SOLAS.  
 
Regulation 13 Fire control plans  
 
Regulation 13 contains requirements about information regarding the ship‟s general 
arrangement that may be of interest from a fire fighting perspective, e.g. fire sections by A and B 
division, the sprinkler and alarm system, fire extinguishing appliances, means of access to 
different compartments, ventilation system etc. For new ships constructed on or after 1 January 
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2003 the information provided in fire control plans and booklet shall be in accordance with the 
IMO resolutions A.756 (18) and A.654.  
 
Regulation 14 Operational readiness and maintenance  
This regulation contains requirements for operational readiness and maintenance and is 
exactly the same as regulation 14.2 in SOLAS.  
 
Regulation 15 Instructions, on-board training and drills  
 
This regulation is exactly the same as SOLAS regulation 15. Regulation 16 Operations This 
regulation corresponds to regulation in SOLAS. 
 
 
Part B of the EU directive  
 
The second part of the fire safety chapter in the EU directive covers more detailed fire safety 
requirements and was also subject to scrutiny. The comparison between the EU and SOLAS 
regulations is summarized in table A2 below and further discussed subsequently 
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Table A2. The regulations in the EU directive 2002/25/EC as amended, chapter II-2, Part B – 
Fire safety measures, and where the same topics are found in SOLAS chapter II-2 
 
 
Regulation 1 Structure  
 
The general structural requirements on hull, superstructures, structural bulkheads, decks and 
the deckhouse imply that these should be made of steel or other equivalent material. This is the 
exactly same formulation as the requirement on overall structural integrity given in SOLAS 
regulation 11.2. Divisions must also fulfil the requirements given in the tables table 4.1 
(Structural integrity of bulkheads) and 4.2 (Decks neither forming steps in main vertical zones 
nor bounding horizontal zones) in the EU directive. These tables are exactly the same as those 
found in SOLAS regulation 9 (table 9.1 and 9.2).  
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Regulation 2 Main vertical zones and horizontal zones  
 
In ships carrying more than 36 passengers, the hull, superstructure and deckhouses shall be 
subdivided into main vertical zones by A-60 class divisions as required in SOLAS regulation 9 
(.2.2.1.1.1). Table 4.2 shows that the minimum integrity of decks is exactly the same as required 
by table 9.2 in SOLAS (2009) and table 4.1 is identical to 9.1 in SOLAS. The classification of 
spaces depending on fire risk is numbered 1-14 are is the same as in SOLAS regulation 9 with the 
following exceptions: control stations in the EU regulations include fire-extinguishing rooms and 
fire recording stations (zone 1), what is mentioned as crew corridors in the EU directive is instead 
lobbies in SOLAS (zone 3), and saunas are not mentioned under accommodation spaces of 
greater fire risk in the EU directive.  
 
Regulation 3 Bulkheads within a main vertical zone  
 
This regulation applies to new class B, C and D ships carrying more than 36 passengers. 
Divisions are allowed to be either A, B or C divisions as long as they fulfil the requirements of 
table 4.1 and 4.2 (regulation 9 in SOLAS). All such divisions may be faced with combustible 
materials according to EU regulation 11, where requirements are set on low flame-spread 
characteristics of surfaces and calorific content of veneers and linings. These are almost the same 
requirements as found in SOLAS regulation 5, paragraph 3.2.2 and 3.2.4. An extra point is that 
exposed surfaces on balconies are mentioned in SOLAS 3.2.4.1.3 but not in the EU directive.  
 
Regulation 4 Fire integrity of bulkheads and decks in new ships carrying more than 36 
passengers  
 
The classification of spaces by fire risk, numbered 1-14, are the same as in SOLAS regulation 
9, with the following exceptions: control stations in the EU regulations includes fire-
extinguishing rooms and fire recording stations (zone 1), what is mentioned as crew corridors in 
the EU directive is instead lobbies in SOLAS (zone 3), and saunas are not mentioned under 
accommodations spaces of greater fire risk in the EU directive. The tables describing 
requirements on divisions in the EU directive are, as mentioned above, exactly the same as the 
corresponding tables in SOLAS.  
 
Regulation 5 Fire integrity of bulkheads and decks in new ships carrying not more than 
36 passengers and existing CLASS B ships carrying more than 36 passengers  
 
This regulation is not taken into the comparative analysis as it is not relevant for the reference 
object in this study.  
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Regulation 6 Means of escape  
 
Regulation 6 sets out the requirements for safe evacuation and escape. For instance this 
regulation includes instructions of how the escape routes should be constructed. The regulation is 
based on regulation 13 in SOLAS.  
 
Regulation 7 Penetration and openings in ‘A’ and ‘B’ class divisions  
 
Openings in A-class divisions  
According to the EU regulation all openings in A-class divisions shall be as effective in 
resisting a fire as the divisions in which they are fitted. A door shall be made of steel or 
equivalent material. According to SOLAS the door shall be tested according to the Fire Test 
Procedures Code [14] but nothing is mentioned about that the door should be tested according to 
the Fire Test Procedures Code [14] in the EU directive. However, it may be intuitive that the 
SOLAS regulations should be followed as the regulation is fully based on SOLAS, see the last 
line in chapter 1 General provisions in the EU directive. The general requirements of the doors 
are otherwise the same as in SOLAS regulation 9.  
 
Openings in B-class divisions  
The requirements on openings in B-class divisions are the same as in SOLAS. Doors and door 
frames shall have the same resistance as the division it is fitted in. Requirements on ventilation 
systems in connection to the doors are also the same as in SOLAS regulations.  
 
Regulation 8 Protection of stairways and lifts in accommodation and service spaces  
 
The objective with this regulation is to prevent the spread of fire through stairways and lifts. 
The corresponding regulation in SOLAS was not found for passenger ships, only for cargo ships 
in regulation 2.3.4.1.  
 
Regulation 9 Ventilation systems  
 
The requirements on the ventilation systems in the EU directive are very similar to SOLAS 
regulations. For instance, the requirements on the ducts passing A and B class divisions are the 
same as in SOLAS. In the EU directive a requirement is also given for the installation of a smoke 
extraction system in public spaces spanning three or more open decks and containing furniture 
and enclosed spaces such as shops and restaurants, see 32.7 in EU directive 2002/25/EC as 
amended. When following the SOLAS regulations this regulation may have to be extracted from 
the EU regulations.  
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Regulation 10 Windows and sidescuttles  
 
The requirements on structural integrity of windows within and towards the outside of the ship 
and embarkation stations are the same as in SOLAS regulation 9.4.  
 
Regulation 11 Restricted use of combustible material  
 
This regulation corresponds fairly with SOLAS Regulation 5, describing how the amount of 
combustible materials should be restricted and requirements regarding surfaces with low flame-
spread characteristics, total allowed volume of combustible facings, mouldings and veneers as 
well as the maximum calorific value of veneers. Nothing is mentioned in the EU regulations 
which cannot be found in SOLAS Regulations 4, 5 or 6. The test of low flame-spread 
characteristics must be carried out according to the Fire Test Procedures Code [14] according to 
SOLAS while no special test for flame-spread characteristics is mentioned in the EU directive.  
 
Regulation 12 Details of construction  
 
“In accommodation and service spaces, control stations, corridors and stairways: .1 air spaces 
enclosed behind ceilings, panelling or lining shall be suitably divided by close-fitting draught 
stops not more than 14 meters apart. .2 in the vertical direction such enclosed air spaces, 
including those behind linings of stairways, trunks, etc. shall be closed at each deck.” This is the 
same requirements as found in Regulation 8.4 in SOLAS.  
 
Regulation 13 Fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems and automatic sprinkler, fire 
detection and fire alarm system  
 
The requirements on the fixed fire detection system, fire alarm system and automatic sprinkler 
are the same as in regulation 7 (.5.2) and 10 (.6.1.1) in SOLAS.  
 
Regulation 14 Protection of special category spaces  
 
Special category spaces are those enclosed vehicle spaces on which vehicles can be driven and 
to which passengers have access. This regulation sets out requirements of the structural integrity, 
fire-extinguishing systems, ventilation systems etc. in these spaces. The requirements on 
structural integrity of special category spaces are found in SOLAS regulation 9.6 and 
requirements on the ventilation system in regulation 9.7 but the other requirements, on e.g. fire-
extinguishing systems, were not found in SOLAS. When referring to SOLAS regulations in a fire 
safety assessment these EU regulations therefore need to be considered. 
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Regulation 15 Fire patrols, detection, alarms and public address systems  
 
Requirements on public address systems, alarms, control of fire doors, detection and patrols 
are brought up in this regulation and corresponding requirements are found in SOLAS regulation 
7.9, 12.2, 14 and 16.  
 
Regulation 16 Upgrading of existing Class B ships carrying more than 36 passengers  
 
This regulation is not commented as our reference ship is not to be upgraded.  
 
Regulation 17 Special requirements for ships carrying dangerous goods  
 
The requirements in SOLAS regulation 19 corresponds to this regulation applying to 
passenger ships carrying dangerous goods.  
 
Regulation 18 Special requirements for helicopter facilities  
 
This regulation is not commented as our reference ship won‟t have any helicopter facility. It is 
otherwise SOLAS regulation 18 that applies in this case. Regulations corresponding to SOLAS 
regulation 20, regarding protection of vehicle spaces, special category and roro spaces, was not 
found in the EU directive. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Figure 3.19. Form of the Report of Approval of Alternative Design and Arrangements for Fire 
Safety 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Figure 3.20. Form of the Document of Approval of Alternative Design and Arrangements for 
Fire Safety 
